



PROCEEDINGS
OF
The Sixteenth Indian Philosophical Congress

Madras

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Part—1

[SYMPOSIUM]

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For Non-Members. }*

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Printed by N. C. Ghosh, M. A.
AT THE TOWN ART PRESS
121/A, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.

On Nationalism.

(Nationalism as a Concept of Political Philosophy)

By

A. R. WADIA.

In all political discussions at the present day nationalism occupies such a dominant place that it is difficult to realise how new the conception really is, and it is this ignorance which gives such an air of finality whenever the word nationalism is mentioned. It bears a very close relationship to the concept of race, but this too is as foggy a conception as it can possibly be. The ancient Greeks kept alive their consciousness of the Hellenic race through their Olympiads and their common gods and goddesses, but they were so engrossed in the politics of their city states that the political import of a racial or a national union was lost on them. The Indo-Aryans divided into various tribes and petty kingdoms failed to achieve a political union which their common ancestry placed within their reach. England and France have been usually mentioned as the earliest examples of compact nationality, but it served more as a stimulus to patriotism than as a concept of political importance. It was only in the 19th. century as one of the legacies of the Napoleonic era that the concept of nation suddenly sprang into great political significance. Germany and Italy after centuries of internal disunion achieved their political unity and the world smiled upon their success in the name of nationalism. It was proclaimed aloud that the 19th. century had discovered the principle of nationality. But even then a wise political thinker had asserted that the task of the 20th. century would be to control this principle. How true this prophecy has

come to be he who runs may read in the pages of contemporary history in all the four continents

And yet what is nationalism? We seek in vain for a definition that will pass the test of a logical examination. Dr. Herbert Adolphus Miller in his paper on *The Nationalistic Epileptic* admits that "there is no concrete and permanent definition of a nation". It does carry with it certain implications, but they are so uncertain in their incidence that they afford no real assistance to our understanding. They are to be found where there is no nation, they are not to be found where they may be expected to be found. Let us briefly survey these leading implications.

A nation, it is said, implies a common ancestry, a kinship of blood. Blood is thicker than water, it is argued, and we are assured by all who swear by racialism and nationalism that if only these kindred groups are allowed to develop their life in their own way, milk and honey would be flowing all over the earth. But a common ancestry did not prevent the American colonists from asserting their independence of England, and, if the Statute of Westminster can be taken at its face value, may not prevent future secessions. But apart from all this, anthropologists and ethnologists themselves cast a doubt on the authenticity of the race concept. As against the authority of Count Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain, who are fundamentally dreamers, we have the authority of sober scientists who look upon race as just a myth. Daniel Defoe in his satiric poem *The Englishman* shows up the different national strands that go to the make up of the Englishman. This was two centuries ago. Since then Chinese and Japanese, Hindu and Muslim and negro blood have added to the variety of the English blood. The device of naturalisation has transformed even pure foreigners into nationals of a new type. In the Englishmen of to-day who can distinguish the descendants of the old Huguenots or the

political refugees from different countries in the 19th. century? What applies to England applies to France as well. A Mittelhauser of obvious German descent is to day a French general fighting against the Germans, and the ranks of Germans would not be free from men of French extraction. But the most striking example is the United States of America. The original streak of English blood has been inundated with millions and millions of the Irish, the Poles, the Russians and the Italians. In fact there is no country in Europe to-day that has not given its quota to the rapid growth of American population in the last century. Nor must we forget the American Indian blood that flows into the American with a certain amount of pride or the negro blood that has coloured the white blood in the teeth of prejudice and open hostility. Truly have the United States of America proved their title to be called the melting pot of the modern world.

When we turn to India in spite of the claim that the institution of the caste is a great bulwark of racial purity we find that racial purity is as much a myth in our country as in Europe or America. All the Sanskrit works right upto to the age of the Dharma Sastras bear abundant witness to the fact of inter-marriage between the Aryans and the old Dravidians. The vast majority of the Indian Muslims are really Hindu in blood. The subtle Bengali has as much Mongol blood in him as Aryan, while the people of the Punjab bear distinct traces of varied blood inheritance : Persian and Greek, Afghan and Moghul.

The evidence of history finds support in the conclusions of scientists like Julian Huxley, who has no hesitation in asserting that race is a myth and quoting the cynical but not inapt definition of nation as "a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbours."

Common history has often been regarded as another element in the make-up of a nation. While this is true in some cases it will hardly bear a generalisation. The common English history has not prevented the British Dominions from insisting on their right to secede from the Empire.

Centuries had to elapse before the common history of Germany and Italy served to rally the different units round the concept of a German and an Italian nation respectively. India with her tradition of scattered kingdoms in the past has found it difficult to live up to Akbar's dream of a united India or to the British expediency of a centralised administration. On the contrary the past history has served to keep fresh old sores and bitter memories. The incorporation of minorities in Europe into large and powerful kingdoms and empires did not succeed in forging a common national consciousness. In short, history is a weapon that has worked both ways : it may foster or retard national union.

Language has often been stressed as a bond of nationality. But it is questionable whether by itself it is a sufficiently cohesive force. The common language has not served to make of the British Empire and the U. S. A. one political unit and till lately Germany and Austria were divided politically in spite of a common language. It is more interesting to note that the existence of more than one language within a political unit has not prevented the development of a strong nationalist sentiment. Switzerland is the most interesting example. It is divided into three natural linguistic areas : German, Italian and French, and in each of these areas the three respective languages are dominant, while in the federation as a whole all the three languages are officially recognised. In the political assemblies all the three languages are spoken so that every member has to be familiar with all the three languages. And yet Switzerland presents one of

the most strongly-knit national units, which has been able to withstand the blandishments of powerful political neighbours like Germany and Italy. Canada with its two distinct strands in its national composition, French and English, has retained French and English as its two official languages, and has developed a strong sense of Canadian nationality which may yet grow stronger in coming years. South Africa recognises both English and Afrikaans as its official languages. We cannot say that the English and Dutch elements in South Africa have blended quite harmoniously, thanks to people like General Hertzog who yet carry with them the bitter memories of the Boer war. Yet the fact that statesmen like General Smuts have so thoroughly identified themselves with the British Empire shows that time might do its work and in future years the Boers and the English might live together as unitedly as the English and the French have done in Canada. Thus we find that language is just an element in forging nationalist sentiment, and by no means an absolutely essential element.

Religion has played a part in politics. It has served to divide as much as to unite groups of mankind. While one religion should go to strengthen national bonds, it does not necessarily do so, while people belonging to two different religions or sects may yet put up with their religious differences in the interest of their country. No period in English history was so surcharged with religious differences as the Tudor period, when English soil was painted red with English blood in the name of God and religion. Yet the sense of national patriotism was never higher than when the Spanish Armada threatened the liberties of England, and that is why the Catholic commander of the English navy stood forth as the champion of the Protestant Queen Bess. Nor has the religious keenness of the Islamic world served to maintain the political unity of the Islamic world.

What then is a nation ? In spite of its frequent use it is so elusive that we can but repeat with Dr. Herbert Adolphus Miller so non-descript an account of nationalism as this : "A nation is merely a psychological union for political and economic administration that also satisfies the yearning of the individual to belong to a group that will give him social dignity." It just becomes a problem of political common sense and good will ; where certain people develops a common love of the country they inhabit and sink their narrow differences ; there we have nationalism, whatever be their language or religion or history. With a concept so vague and yet charged with emotional dynamite the task of political philosophy to clarify political issues becomes doubly hard. Where has the concept of nationality led the world to ? Circumspice ! Nationalism by itself is fraught with dangerous possibilities. Minorities impelled by nationalism may rebel against their political masters. Civil war is the least of its dangers. But what catastrophies happen when the sense of nationalism develops into a superiority complex and its leaders begin bursting with the sense of their historical missions and conquering innocent peoples to make them hewers of wood and drawers of water or to transform them into the pattern of the conquering "superior" people. And all this can be realised to-day only through wars of the most devastating character. Truly can it be said that cannons are expensive, but cannon fodder has become cheap.

The world politics for the last quarter of a century has suffered from an excess of nationalism and the Treaty of Versailles may be looked upon as the peak point of a movement which was sooner or later bound to lead to disaster, and that is the disaster under which the world is reeling to-day, drunk with the wine of power. Dr. Seton Watson claims the Treaty of Versailles as "the first international settlement

which its authors deliberately tried to erect upon definite ethical principles." Perhaps! But these ethical principles based on the principle of nationalism represent an order which has really to be curbed rather than fostered, an order which has fed on beautiful, but foggy words, has become a hindrance to the progress of humanity as a whole. President Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points have become a landmark in the history of nationalism as a political principle. His point No. 11 spoke of "historically established lines of allegiance and nationality". In his later speeches he spoke of Four Principles, the fourth of which was: "the satisfaction of all well-defined national aspirations without introducing or perpetuating antagonisms likely to endanger peace." The result of this well-meant policy was the creation of too many small nations inevitably carved out of the defeated empires: German, Austrian and Turkish. It was forgotten by the statesmen that sponsored the Treaty of Versailles that the small nations they set up had not even the virtue of being really homogeneous. Every one of them has had to face the problem of discontented minorities, who have fumed, fretted and created opportunities to serve as an excuse for working against the interests of the states in which their lot was cast. It would be futile to deny in the face of sober history that France and England felt that the policy of having these small national states would make for peace as crippling their old enemies for good. In actual fact it has produced Mussolini and then Hitler. The really ethical portion of the Treaty of Versailles centred in two features: the principle of disarmament and even more the League of Nations. Unfortunately the time when disarmament was possible was allowed to slip by. France was willing to reduce the navy, but not the army, while England was willing to reduce the army but not the navy. Russia as an international outlaw was driven to arm herself to teeth in the face of internal rebellions fostered by France and England. Japan went her

way in the east. The net upshot was that disarmament became a joke too grim for words.

The League of Nations was in itself a perfectly sound principle, but the terrible uncertainty of American politics made it a leaky vessel from the very beginning. From its birth the League became a League of the European nations, and even so a League of the European victors. The astuteness of Mr. Lloyd George made the component parts of the British Empire individual members, which only gave the British Empire a predominating position so that the future success or failure of the League rested on how England with her Dominions would give a lead in every important question that cropped up. Politically the League has proved a tragic failure with the ghosts of Manchuria and Abyssinia haunting its council chambers.

The mischief that an excessive veneration for the principle of nationalism has wrought in our times is fully illustrated by the history of the British Empire during the last twenty years. The British Empire with the King-in-Parliament in England as the apex was a force that made for peace over large tracts on the surface of the earth. But the children of England, the great colonies, were becoming restive and drunk with the wine of nationalism looked upon their mother as if she were a step-mother intent upon the ruin of her step-children. The mother became cautious and fearing to lose them was prepared for a compromise. The British Empire was officially buried and in its place a new entity, the British Commonwealth of Nations, came into existence. Lord Balfour's Declaration of 1926 laid down: "They (the Dominions) are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as

members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Four years later in 1930 the Statute of Westminster became law. The tragic result of it we see to-day: Ireland is neutral and this in the hour of England's greatest danger in her long history. The magnificent loyalty of the other Dominions seems to give a lie to the argument I have been seeking to develop. But it is an open question whether the Dominions are strong enough to stand on their own legs. Without the protecting arm of the British navy, the independence of Australia is no more secure than the independence of Poland and Norway has proved to be, while South Africa is not much more secure. Canada alone is in a position to break off from the British moorings. Hence her loyalty at the present juncture is all the more praiseworthy. Nor must we forget that the war has come much too early thanks to the impetuosity of Hitler. The separatist tendency of the Dominions has not had time to take root and so the old ideals and the old loyalties are yet vital enough to have made themselves felt at the present moment.

All the same this new phase in the history of British Imperialism carries within itself future dangers, and from the standpoint of political thought it is an experiment of doubtful worth. As my old teacher Professor W. G. Adams of Oxford told me once the British Empire as a large federation makes for peace over the large areas comprised within itself. It is worth while developing this idea a little further.

That such large dominions as Australia and Canada and South Africa would permanently agree to be under the leading strings of England can hardly be hoped for, nor would it be desirable. But it is certainly worth while considering whether from the standpoint of England as well as of the Dominions it would not have been better if the principle of federation had come to be established. If under the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster even England

just figures as one of the "communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs," could not the same end have been achieved by a federal parliament sitting in London, while each of the component partners would have each its own parliament to look after its merely domestic concerns? True, under this scheme the Mother of Parliaments may have lost its present importance, but then it may have been spared the humiliation of a defiant Ireland playing the dangerous role of a neutral harbouring the ambassadors and the nationals of enemy countries.

A federal constitution would also prove of use in curbing the dangerous nationalist propensities of the individual Dominions. If India is important enough to be promised Dominion Status she can legitimately and effectively protest under a federal constitution against her children being treated as pariahs in the other British Dominions. As things are, England dare not interfere with the suicidally exclusive policy pursued by the Dominions. The united force of federalism may however, wring out justice as the sentimental loyalty to the Crown of England can never hope to achieve. In the interests of common security each unit of the federation may be prepared to give up what each with full power concentrated in its own hands may refuse to do.

But there is another aspect of the policy of the Dominions actively pursued, which will always threaten the peace of the world. And that is the immigration policy of these Dominions. Though England was not the first in the race of colonial expansion, she has been exceptionally fortunate in this respect. Apart from India she has mastery over vast tracts of land. All of them are rich and yet very thinly populated. Not merely are coloured Indians kept out, but even white Europeans. While Europe itself is very thickly

populated there is little outlet for the Europeans of the continental countries, and yet the English dominions are sitting tight on vast expanses which they neither populate by themselves nor allow others to populate them. Such a state of affairs is bound to be resented by powerful countries and in an armed world there can be nothing but war. Let us consider these figures. Canada has a population of 11 millions, while it can support a population of 50 millions. Australia has only 6.5 millions while it can have 46 millions, at present it has only two inhabitants per square mile. Compare this with the density of population in Germany, Italy and Japan. England is indeed very thickly populated, but she has made herself an industrial country par excellence, with a quarter of her population concentrated round about London. But to proceed with the figures relating to the Dominions. New Zealand has only half a million as against a possible 13 millions. South Africa is more thickly populated, but the dominant white population is a small minority. It is in the light of these figures that the exclusivist tendencies of the nations comprised within the British Commonwealth cannot but arouse fears of wars, for such an unnatural distribution of land cannot last for ever, and the one mainstay of it, the British navy, will have to contend in coming years more and more against all the potentialities of aeroplanes.

What then is the ultimate value of nationality as a political concept? That it has been of great cultural value in the past cannot be denied by anybody. But in these days the radio and the aeroplane have made the world really so small as to annihilate distances, and the commercial contacts have become so intimate that every war is an economic disaster. This is an axiom which Sir Norman Angel has laboured hard to prove, and every successive war has only served to support his thesis. Politically a war becomes even a greater disaster, for in these "civilised" days of aerial bombs and poison gasses and vast armies

of millions the distinction between the civilian and the soldier has practically disappeared. And it is certainly an odd solution of the problem of population to send the very best of men—and perhaps even women—to be slaughtered in their millions. And the end of it all is just that ground drinks blood like wine.

Militant nationalism does not take long to degenerate into an aggressive imperialism. Nationalism as an ultimate principle of politics stands out in all its naked bankruptcy. The world to-day faces a similar situation as the Greeks did when they found their beloved city states threatened with the extinction of their political liberties by the cohorts of Philip of Macedon. We may gloat over the cultural splendour of Athens or the stern discipline of Sparta. We may enthuse over the immortal Philipics of Demosthenes. But we cannot be blind to the fact that the days of the city states had been numbered, that they had had their day, but they had outlived their usefulness, in fact they had become a hindrance to the further progress of the Greeks. True, Greece lost her freedom, but she died only to live again in the East and the West. The Greek culture, which used to be confined within the narrow limits of the four city walls now burst these prison walls and became the culture of half the world. The same line of thought applies to the nation states to-day. Each nation big and small, vaunting its own greatness, eager to exploit the weaknesses of their neighbours has become a danger to the peace of the world. The scramble that followed the German rape of Czechoslovakia, when Hungary and Poland thought of enlarging their own domains, forgetful of the fate that hung over their own heads is worthy of being a theme for a comic opera, were it not for the fact that such comedies usually prove to be the preludes to grim tragedies. These nation states with their unredeemed hunger for more and more land have become a perpetual danger to the peace of the world. Must they go? They need

not, but in a new world order the superstition of the ultimate supremacy of the nation state will have to go. If a big nation state is a threat, a small nation state is a temptation. If the old city states had to be absorbed into a larger union, small nation state may as well try to preserve their own cultural utility within the framework of a large federation, strong enough to withstand the aggression of an unscrupulous powerful neighbour. The compact federation of the U. S. A. is a model for the rest of the world to follow. Even the loose federation of the British Empire has its own lessons to teach. A nation that is perpetually haunted by the fear of war and can never hope to be strong enough to resist any aggression through its own unaided efforts has really no right to an independent existence. This sounds harsh, even cruel. But life is cruel and he who lives in a fool's paradise does so at his own peril. To expect non-violence of the Gandhian variety to replace war is a dream, which in one sense is impossible and in another sense is not even desirable. Non-violence can hope to be real and to achieve its end only on one condition: that life is reduced to a dead dullness of uniformity with all our wants practically reduced to zero. In such an insipid world without beauty, without comfort there will be nothing in the world to envy any one about, and there may be no war. But such a world is just a rustic Arcadia, which looks fine on paper perhaps, but few would care to see literally realised with life slipping back into the era of bullock carts and flickering wicks. When poverty is equalised and life unindustrialised there may be no war but the remedy may prove worse than the disease.

For our political thought to end in so lifeless an ideal would be to proclaim its bankruptcy. Surely there may be a middle path by which we can attain all the goods of life and reduce the risks of war. Politics has never known an absolute best. Each age has its own problem and its own solution. *We know enough of life to make

us realise the futility of mere utopias. Take man as he is : a mixture of good and evil, capable of being disciplined through fear and the development of a social sense, which has made him in the past pass through all the stages of hordes, clans, tribes, city states and country states and empires. A world state may be still desirable, but it is a distant dream. With the given material and with the human nature as it has been : not so evil as it was, not so good as it might be, what can be done to-day to reduce the risk of devastating wars and to give a certain stability to human life ? Ethics will have its say, and economics its own pet formulæ. What has politics to say ? I think the political solution of our present problems is to create the age of federation.

At present we have a few big powers who think of the world in terms of themselves : balance of power, status quo, a league of nations (a few conquering and European) are all nostrums which have failed to preserve peace. Small nations by themselves are likely to preserve peace—though even of this we cannot be absolutely sure—but they become pawns in the hands of big power diplomacy. A League of large federated unions may succeed where the old League of Nations failed so miserably. The Treaty of Versailles missed a great chance when it created small nations, which have all tumbled down in the course of the last one year. If it had created large federated unions the military strength of each would have put an automatic check on the greed of others. A union of the Baltic states pooling their resources together, both economic and military, could have presented a front to Germany in striking contrast to one weak independent state after another succumbing helplessly to the might of the conqueror. Similarly the Balkan states could form a strong block. The Islamic countries might form a large empire extending from the Mediterranean to the

frontiers of India. India in itself a continent might figure as an important limb of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or might constitute a unit by itself or with Ceylon and south eastern Asia to whose cultural growth she has contributed so materially through the ages. China and Japan might form a union in eastern Asia. There is bound to be an endless difference of opinion about details, but they need not affect the general principle that the world needs a political organisation on the basis of large federated unions. Within each federation the component parts can have their own individual cultural life—and this is the only part of nationalism worth conserving—while the federal parliament will look to the economic and military organisation of its resources as a whole. If it is argued that no nation worth the name can sign its own death warrant to be merged into a big partnership with other bigger or smaller nations, my answer is that the fostering of such a narrow nationality is itself a danger inviting a total annihilation, whereas a voluntary sacrifice of some power in relation to foreign policy and military organisation may ultimately lead to the preservation of all that is best in that vague and shifting term : *nation*. In the hey day of Indian nationalism Arabindo Ghosh may have said : “Nationalism is not a mere political programme. Nationalism is a religion that has come from God. Nationalism is a creed in which you shall have to live. Nationalism is not going to be crushed. Nationalism is immortal ; nationalism cannot die”.

But we must not forget that behind and beyond all nations lies *Humanity*. Prophets of all ages and all climes have struggled to paint in bright colours the claims of man as man, of the brotherhood of men in the highest sense of the term. Narrower loyalties have always defied the hopes of the prophets. But in the course of our human evolution our narrower loyalties have been slowly but

steadily overcome. The next step lies in the large federations I have been speaking about. Perhaps through such a step humanity will come nearer the ideal of the oneness of humanity. The international character of religion has come to nothing through the devilries of narrow politics. Through federations the human soul may come nearer the goal of humanity as just one.

Nationalism as a Principle of Political Philosophy

By

J. F. BUTLER

No one could deny the great importance of nationalism in the world today ; but it would be hard to say just what is meant by the word. Actually the word is used very loosely ; in order to deal with it at all, I must choose and abide by some one not altogether indefinite sense out of the many in which it is used. Accordingly, I shall use it here, still rather vaguely, in the sense of the doctrine which lays great stress on the nation as much the most important unit of social organisation.

This definition, of course, brings us face to face with the deeper and more difficult problem, What is a nation ? Is it held together by common race, common soil, common economic needs ? Or by what ? Here I must simply bow in respect to this problem, and pass on. The problem of the connotation of 'nation' is intensely difficult ; but we can sufficiently recognise what is meant by 'nation' by its denotation, by reviewing in our minds the large-scale organisations of our political life, the political units which claim a complete or a very high degree of independence, of 'sovereignty'. (This indeed leaves us with several cases difficult to decide about, e. g., pre-occupation Belgium and Czecho-Slovakia, cases which reflect the difficulties about the connotation ; in spite of these, the denotation will be sufficiently exact for our present purposes.)

The nation, thus roughly understood, is a form of social organisation—but only one form. It has its rights and powers bounded in two ways, (I) by the rights and powers of the individual, which bound the rights and powers of all social organisations, and (II) by the rights and powers of other social organisations.

(I) It seems to the present writer self-evident that all social organisations are for the sake of the individual, and not *vice versa*. This view is held in too extreme a form, or perhaps one should say is improperly applied, if it is forgotten that individual rights severely limit each other, and also that man, individual man, is essentially a social animal, desiring and needing societies (even societies that call for much self-sacrifice) if his being is not to be frustrated. If such truths are forgotten, the stress laid on the individual leads to such errors as *laissez-faire* in economics and self-centredness in ethics; and the combined prevalence and danger of such errors is doubtless responsible for much of the modern exaggerated stress on the nation. (Compare the claim made by Nazism and Fascism to have given to European youth a discipline, a sacrificial spirit, and a social happiness which earlier *regimes*, so the claim runs, simply did not provide.) But errors can be avoided in wiser ways than that of swinging over to the error of the opposite extreme.

(II) The rights and powers of the nations are also bounded by those of other social groupings. These are of two main kinds, (i) the more inclusive society (or, temporally, societies) of internationalism, and (ii) the less inclusive societies within the nation.

(i) Internationalism has never had supremacy, but has often had importance, as in Europe at the time when national policies were influenced by the international authorities (unfortunately for internationalism, generally divided), of Emperor and Pope, and, recently, during the period of the

importance of the League of Nations. Even in other periods its ghost has often been there, in the form of international law. The present period, which has just witnessed the downfall of the League of Nations by a combination of the aggression of some nations and the apathy of others, might seem one in which the idea of internationalism is next door to dead. And yet in another sense it is the period of internationalism's triumph. Everywhere it is taken for granted that some sort of international order must come, if mankind survives at all; the question is simply whether it will be an imperialistic or a democratic one, an imposed or an agreed one, and, if it is to be democratic and agreed, of what sort it shall be. (An imposed or an agreed internationalism are the only possible alternatives in a world where nations cannot keep a balance of power, and the history of the last thirty years has shown that the shrunken distances and military horrors due to science have made the old balance-of-power policy impossible.)

(ii) The powers and rights of the nation are further bounded by those of social units smaller than itself. These are of different types, which can be grouped roughly thus :

(1) The smaller, compulsory, regional groupings. No nation can be ruled entirely from the centre; it has to have smaller regional groupings. (These, of course, vary in type from nation to nation; the British-Indian hierarchy of the local groups of presidency, district, *taluk*, municipality or village, etc., is typical.) These vary vastly in their rights and powers. They may be mere administrative units, making no claim upon the affection or loyalty or cooperation of their members, except as a piece of the machinery of the national government; but in most countries it is found either right or necessary or convenient to give them a more real political existence, with powers of local government and corresponding sentiments of local patriotism. True, in most parts of the

world the modern stress on the nation has led to a swing of interest away from these local groupings. In Britain, for instance, local rights and sentiments which had survived the earlier hammering of Britain together into a nation have recently been whittled away under schemes, of national planning; in America, hitherto, jealously guarded 'State rights' have not been altogether effective in checking the growth of the power of a central bureaucracy under the 'New Deal'. But there are signs that in other ways attempts may soon be made to achieve decentralisation. In Britain, for example, before the war put all such questions into abeyance, there was a growing body of opinion that if more government were done from regional capitals such as Edinburgh the life of the 'provinces' would be invigorated, and at the same time the definitely unhealthy growth of London would be checked. Certainly Britain, by its neglect of local government, has come to be faced with twin evils—its local councils have come to be in the hands of the retired-small-capitalist type (a poor type for the purpose), and its central Parliament has no political personnel to recruit itself from except retired-big capitalists, barristers, professional politicians, and professional labour leaders (a most unrepresentative collection). In such cases, some degree of decentralisation might seem to be the way of wisdom. On the other hand, Ancient Greece, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugo-Slavia show the dangers in that course.

(2) The family. This was the precursor of the nation as the main social unit, and was long its rival. Doubtless it can never again be a direct rival of the state, though it may still hamper the state by deflecting from the state a good proportion of man's limited power of unselfish feeling and action. (Cf. Plato's *Republic*.) On the other hand, any state which abolished it would have to make alternative provision for both sexual satisfaction and the continuance

of the race, and would be unlikely to find an alternative which not only combines provision for these two needs so economically but also ennobles them both in their union. The family is now in some degree a compulsory and in some degree a voluntary institution, the degree of compulsion varying in different nations with variations in the freedom of choice of partners, in the divorce laws, in the arrangements for the support of children, and so on.

(3) The voluntary associations for limited purposes. These have various relations to the nation. (I am here thinking of them as parts of the nation. The fact that they can be international introduces further complications.) There are the purely political parties, revolutionary and constitutional; there are the philanthropic societies, which seek to influence the nation for good each as regards one particular problem; there are the recreational societies, like stamp-collectors' clubs, which have and seek to have no influence on the nation whatever, except that, on the one hand, they organise amusement for a section of the nation, and, on the other hand, perhaps they deflect some portion of its social energies away from national concerns. (The most curious case of the interaction of nations with one of these special organisations has been the history of Church and State in Europe. How far can an organisation which regards itself as the mouthpiece of the will of God remain voluntary? How far can the State rightly enforce the decisions of religious leaders? Is the other-worldliness of religion a source of political weakness, as 'the dope of the people'; or is this other-worldliness the only possible source of that unselfishness on which every state in the end relies? These and similar questions have arisen around the interaction of Church and State in Europe.)

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One should note that all these other social organisations, and also the rights of the individual as such, exist only on sufferance. So long as the nation has the powers which it at present has in most parts of the world, then these other rights, even if they are morally well founded, or guaranteed by treaty or constitution, can be overridden by a determined nation. True, even the strongest nation may have to go slowly in such a course, for at present few people recognise their nation's powers as absolute, and so cannot be relied on to support it whatever it does. Nevertheless, on the whole, the nation has nearly all the ultimate political power in its hands

The nation, then, is not the only social unit, nor has it always been the main one; but it has at present a *de facto* supremacy over the rest. The history of the nations shows that this supremacy is not based on necessity, but on a sentiment and a sentiment which can fluctuate. The basis of British nationhood, for example, is the fact that Britons feel towards each other and towards the soil of Britain in a way in which they do not feel towards Frenchmen and the soil of France. A thousand years ago Wessex men and Northumbrians felt towards each other as they now jointly feel towards France: a thousand years hence Britons and Frenchmen may feel together as Wessex men and Northumbrians feel together now.

The basis of nationalism, then, is a sentiment, and not a necessary one: is it, nevertheless, a desirable one? The nation does have certain advantages, which make it a desirable focus for social sentiment. For instance, it is a conveniently large administrative unit for many purposes—though not large enough for many purposes imposed by modern economics. It is a natural unit of culture—though modern culture, under the influence of science, is tending more and

more to be international. (Somewhat similarly, Western mediaeval culture also was, mainly, more international and regional than national.) Race, tradition, and other ties tend in most cases to make the nation the easiest social group to rouse emotion about, which, in cases where society suffers from chronic selfishness, is something to be thankful for—yet the modern world blares aloud the dangers of this emotion carried to excess, and the difficulties of keeping it within due bounds.

On the whole one may say that the nation is a useful unit, if and when it is curbed by an effective internationalistic sentiment above it, and by a revitalised regional sentiment within it, and by a healthy sense of the centrality of the individual as the basis of the whole social structure.

I would wish in conclusion to emphasise that this judgment (which clearly involves a condemnation of nationalism in the sense laid down at the outset) claims to be an answer only to the question set, on the position of 'nationalism as a principle of political philosophy.' It is not, therefore, directly, a judgment concerning any actual nationalistic movements; such a judgment would belong not to political philosophy, but to politics.

Let me try to make this distinction clearer. Philosophy concerns itself as much as possible, only with general principles. The factual element cannot, indeed, be altogether purged out of any branch of philosophy; but in some branches, such as metaphysics, it is reduced to a minimum, as in such branches only the most general facts are taken into consideration. Other branches, such as political philosophy, are less 'pure'—they take account of more detailed and particular sets of facts. Political philosophy is directed at every step by the facts of history and of human nature. But it still retains some degree of generality, by dealing with history

only in its broad outlines with only the universal elements in human nature. It can thus arrive at comparatively general conclusions, which will have both the merits and defects of their comparative generality; *i. e.*, they will have some application to every situation, but perfect application to none.

Although, then, I have here arrived at a condemnation of nationalism as a general, a 'philosophical' principle, I am quite prepared to admit that in any actual situation concerning nationalism which may arise in politics ('the art of the possible'), there may be circumstances which make it either right, or necessary, or both, to lay far greater stress upon the nation than is right in normal circumstances. For example, modern Britain may need, in peace-time, both decentralisation and internationalism; but obviously she cannot afford either just now, and could not have afforded either in, say, Alfred's time. The peculiar situations in America of the immigration days, in Czecho Slovakia during the brief period of her existence, in India today, may have called or may call for temporary and local modifications of this general conclusion, to meet abnormal sets of particular facts. Whether that is so or not is a political judgment, a judgment on the particular application of the general principle; and with such I have, mercifully, no concern here. The only practical advice, in this matter, which the political philosopher can offer to the politician is that, whether the politician in any immediate problem can apply or must override the general principle, he will do well to keep it fully in mind when long scale planning is in question.

Comments

From one point of view, this symposium is most disappointing: there is so much agreement! It would have given spice to the discussion had our condemnations of unbridled nationalism been varied by someone who feels the

ties of blood or of land so exclusively that he finds in his nation a higher self with a greatness above all restraints. Then we should have witnessed that clash of mind with mind which thrills the philosopher as war thrills the nationalist !

Yet to judge thus is to value too highly the very specialised pleasure in intellectual controversy which is all that modern philosophy, with its wide divergences on fundamentals, can give us instead of agreed truth. Such pleasure is perhaps partly a compensation-value invented by us to soften our disappointment at not getting agreement, and is partly just a sublimation of our natural pugnacity. In any case, there are branches of philosophy in connection with which it seems out of place. Political thinking has repercussions on the life of humanity too serious for us to be able to enjoy with any heartiness anything that weakens the cause of what we take to be the truth. Extreme nationalism has claimed too many victims in its wars for us to be glad to see it anywhere, though its absence may cost us some loss of thrill in variety. It is a fact not without significance and hope if the philosophers of this country really are agreed that nationalism, though containing elements of value and truth, is a principle much in need of being balanced with other principles. •

With what other principles ? Here I would like to be allowed again to draw attention to an aspect of the matter in which I seemed to get neither support nor opposition from my fellow-contributors, viz, the importance of the intra-national, or sectional, combinations. I cannot but think that these are of vast importance for the sociologist, both as sources of human joy and uplift in themselves, and also for their effect on the nation ; for they are (if I may describe the situation in mixed metaphors) both buffer-ideas saving the idea of the nation from fanaticism, and also training-grounds for efficient democratic

service to the nation. Only strong, responsible local administration and strong, free social groupings can keep national politics sweet. (Cf. McDougall's remarks in *The Group Mind* on the dangers of excessive centralisation in France ; note also the corruption which has spread into American national politics mainly from municipal sources.)

In connection with this matter of sectional combinations, it is strange that none of us have said anything about castes or communities, and only Professor Banerjee has mentioned classes. Yet the first two of these types of groupings are very pertinent to the Indian situation ; and classes are important in the general problem of nationhood, since class-feeling seems to be the alternative to national feeling which modern capitalist states develop, when not under pressure of war or preparation for war ; moreover, it serves as the basis of a certain type of internationalism.

So much for the sectional organisations : next, what sort of international organisations do we desire ? Professor Wadia favours a few large federal unions. Professor Banerjee, with hesitation, inclines towards a communistic internationalism, though not of the Russian type. I would welcome Professor Wadia's unions, if they could be brought into being, and if they could then be kept from clashing like gigantic nations. These provisoes are large ones ; but, as Professor Wadia's illustrations partly show, federal unions might, if carefully planned and set in a proper world-league framework, prevent a repetition of the weaknesses of the old League of Nations. I would reject entirely Professor Banerjee's communism for the same reasons as make Professor Banerjee himself hesitate over it, reject it in its Russian form, and finally accept it only as a *pis aller*—namely, because of its materialism and accompanying totalitarianism of spirit. Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* seems to me to be still the last word on that kind

of social experimentation. (I would not however deny that the world ought *ultimately* to become semi-communist, in a certain sense).

But I may seem churlish in criticising my colleagues for the constructive theories they have put forward, while I have forestalled similar criticism of me by the simple method of not offering anything constructive to criticise. I ought to say, then, that I have deliberately refrained from attempting construction, for two reasons :

(1) Politics is 'the art of the possible' ; in political theory, then, we must never forget that we are exercising an art, i.e., we are not at the mercy of our materials, but can manipulate them, within limits ; but neither must we forget that an art of the possible depends to some extent on hard facts. We need not fall into the cynicism of merely recording facts as if they were laws ; but neither must we lose touch with reality and rear mere Utopias. We must have facts to build on ; and the facts at present are melted at the forge of war ; what they will be like when they re-emerge into the normal state when they are partly in the control of the economist and the sociologist we simply do not know, and I cannot see much profit in guessing about them.

(2) The fact, on which all we contributors seem agreed, that nationalism is a *sentiment*, means that our main problem is a psychological one, and one to which, so far as I know, the psychologists have not yet given us a solution. For, if nationalism is a sentiment, and we wish to curb it and replace its extremes by stress on an enlarged community, we have got to know how to curb one kind of social sentiment, namely nationalism, and how to replace it by some other. I am not aware that the psychologists have quite got round to this problem yet. Nationalism, regarded as a static thing,

has been fairly thoroughly studied by social psychologists ; it has even been studied, to some extent, as a moving sentiment, in the sense of an increasing one—there is plenty of material for a study of the growth of a sense of nationhood in the histories of Germany, Italy, America, and India. There is even plenty of material (I do not know how far it has been used) for a study of the artificial stimulation of nationalism, in the history of post-1918 Europe. But our problem goes further ; we have mainly to ask not what nationalism is when it stands still, or how it increases, or how it can be increased, but how it can be decreased, and how the sentiment for its substitute can be increased. As this has never been accomplished (except in the outmoded imperial way), there is no direct empirical evidence bearing on the problem ; theory will have to be built up from general principles and from the analogies provided by the making of nations out of smaller *foci* of sentiment. In these matters, I am off my own subject, and I do not know how far psychologists have actually worked at this problem. At any rate, that is our real problem—how to feel, and get others to feel, in the hard international way instead of in the easy national way. For reasons that plenty of psychologists have already told us, it is easy to feel nationally ; for reasons that plenty of sociologists have told us, it is essential to feel internationally : our problem is how to get the emotion into the internationalism. It is hard enough for us philosophers, who would probably claim that our training had put our emotions considerably under the control of our intellect : how much harder for the masses of men ! Yet till the masses of men feel a passion for internationalism, no nation will surrender its sovereignty, no international police force will be able to be manned by anything but the worst type of mercenaries ; and in other ways the international idea is bound to break down.

The international sentiment has three foes to cope with ; firstly, the already ingrained nationalism ; secondly, man's difficulty in feeling enthusiastic for what is large-scale and remote and strange ; thirdly, the fact that the international order, once established, can by definition have no external foes, and so is deprived of war, which the nations have found to be the great whipper-up of social enthusiasm. These it must fight, so far as I can see, with man's sense of economic self-interest, with his capacity for sheer altruism, and with religion, which is (among other things) the greatest instrument for turning intellectual convictions into enthusiastic sentiments. But we need to see this whole matter worked out carefully by the psychologists.

We contributors to the symposium, then, have written surprisingly little on the psychology relevant to our subject. We have also written very little on the relevant economics. (Professor Banerjee has touched on some aspects of this.) What is still more surprising is that we have written very little on the *philosophy* of nationhood, as this would have been understood a generation ago. Professor Banerjee has indeed given us some historical account of the thought of Hegel and other classical philosophers of society ; but we have none of us gone ourselves into such questions as those of the metaphysical notions of the individual and society, as did Hegel, and Green in modifying him, and Bosanquet in expounding him, and Hobhouse in demolishing him. Was this simply because our subject was a limited one, and our space limited ? Or was it that we none of us cared to go thoroughly into the metaphysics of our subject ? Or have we, in being more empirical than was a past generation, thereby based ourselves upon a better metaphysic than theirs ?

• On one thing atleast we can congratulate ourselves—we have avoided a logomachy on the sense of 'nationalism'.

Without any arrangement between ourselves, we have all happened to use it in much the same sense. This sense is, I believe, a useful and a justified one ; but in reading the speeches of Indian leaders recently I have come to see clearly, what I already suspected, that this sense is not the only, or indeed the usual, one in which it is used in India. This being so, I take it that we' would all wish to remind our readers that it is only nationalism in one special sense that we are opposing in these papers.

Nationalism as a Principle of Political Philosophy

By
J. C. BANERJEE

The term 'Nation' has been used in different senses at different times in the history of Politics. The implication of Nation refers to a group of persons who compose a political community. Hence it denotes an aggregate of individuals who are united amongst themselves by a tie of common interest—an interest created by their possession of a common institution, a common religion, a common language, etc.

By 'Nazione' the Fascist understands "an organism, possessing ends, existence, and means of an action superior both in power and duration to those of the single individuals and groups which compose it". In modern Germany the word 'Volk' has been substituted for 'Nation'. By 'Volk' is meant the group of individuals who are of German descent either living in Germany or elsewhere. It is the organic unity and the 'Staat' is nothing but the living organization of Volk, which preserves the cultural heritage of the race and promotes in the individual the highest freedom by developing their inherent spiritual power. Thus 'Volk' in German denotes a body of men who are physically and therefore spiritually, of common descent.

The Nature of Nation :—Whatever the differences of opinion there may be in regard to the precise meaning of Nation, the concept of Nation, if truly analysed, may be found to be constituted of a group having certain characteristics which may be described as follows :—

(1) The idea of possessing a *common Government* is one of the most important characteristics of a nation. It is through

the state that the nationalists believe that people of the country shall be able to develop their national consciousness using their national language and promoting their national culture. And hence the State must necessarily have a well-defined territory in order to unite the inhabitants of the marked land under a common bondage and obligation.

(2) Secondly each nation has got some special feature of its own which distinguishes itself from other sister-nations and political organizations. This speciality arises out of the speciality of the origin, language, culture, and religion of a particular group of individuals. Though each of these factors, if considered separately and analytically may not stand as a sufficient ground of national consciousness, yet it may be remarked that all of them taken together constitute the nature of a nation. Of these a *common language* plays a very important part in the formation of the Group-consciousness. If a nation has a particular distinctive language for a considerable period of time, it is quite natural that it will develop a particular culture of its own. Perhaps no other factor is so obvious and important as the 'cultural heritage' in the course of the development of the national feeling. This is not all; the speciality of a culture of a nation is originated from that of its source. So a common origin or '*common descent*' is another feature of a nation. Ordinarily this feature was found to be very strong in the primitive communities, but its importance can hardly be minimised in the modern communities also. The burning illustrations are German Nazism and some political organizations of India.

Religion is no less important in the formation of the culture of a nation. In Europe, of course, this factor has almost been eliminated now-a-days from her national life; but its importance was incalculable not only in her Mediaeval

period but also until the beginning of the 19th century. And its effect is so well known in Indian soil that it needs no mention. The effect of climate and geographical conditions upon the inhabitants, is also to be recognised as an important factor in the speciality of a nation.

(3) Lastly, another important feature of the nation is that the group must have a certain degree of *common feeling* or *will* which will be specially 'national' in character. In spite of having all those common factors, previously mentioned, a group of individuals cannot be organized into a nation if it does not possess this feeling. The psychological factor, we presume, is the driving force for common interest, common ideals and aspirations, and for the united action for the realisation of the ideal of the nation.*

These are the characters of Nation and hence Nationalism may be described as a consciousness of these distinctive characters of the nation of which the individual is a member accompanied by a feeling of 'will to live' together and a desire to promote the welfare, strength, liberty and prosperity of the nation in general.

Origin of Nationalism :— As to the origin of 'Nationalism' in human society the problems can be approached from two angles of vision, viz, *psychological* and *historical*. Psychologically speaking, the impulse for the group formation in the line of national character may be said to be inherent in man,

*Monsieur Daladier, in the course of his speech in Corsica in January, 1959, has remarked, "France is made of common ideals and common hopes. Whatever our local origin, we have become French because we have *wished* to be French. France was not born of an act of fate. She represents a free and voluntary union of all her provinces who have constituted to the Greatness of the Mother Country, in a spirit of civilization and Fraternity." (The Times, Jan. 3, 1939).

in the sense that it is nothing but the rationalization of the herd instinct of animal. But historically speaking, nations come into existence at a certain period of human civilization. And this, as some historians are of opinion, did not emerge until the close of the Middle Ages ; whereas others do maintain that the present concept of nation can hardly be traced back to the French Revolution. However, the historians might differ or agree on the basis of the facts of their respective observation it may be remarked that hardly any such concept or feeling as '*national feeling*' can be said to have originated at a particular time. It is true that the full-fledged form of a nation might have been visualised in the shape of a concrete reality in history at a particular time and place, but certainly it is the inherent tendencies of man that have helped him in the gradual formation and development of such social and political organizations in the history of his life.

The Basic Principles of Nationalism :—The principles that stand as the underlying bases of all forms of nationalism may be said to have originated from the various political theories as propounded by different Philosophers. Amongst these Hobbes's Doctrine of *Sovereignty and Natural Law* may be mentioned first. Hobbes's theory justifies absolute sovereignty in the society. His political theory is mainly based on his egoistic psychological premises. His doctrine of absolute sovereignty was nothing but a reaction against the provision of Natural Law which was the moral basis for the Social Contract theory that was prevalent in England during his time. The Natural Law or the Divine Law was the Common law of England at that time. But by contract Hobbes understands that which exists between the various individuals composing the society and not between individuals and the king who is by nature outside and above any such contract or law. It may be pointed out, however, that the moral obligation to obey a

ruler permanently does not follow from his egoistic principle of self-interest.

Next we come to John Locke. The belief in natural law is, so to say, the ground of his political philosophy. It is in his theology that his political conception is embedded. Just as Nature is governed by the Divine Law which is nothing but Law of Reason, so also man should obey reason which is the basic law of his nature. So the society for him is a means for enabling man to enjoy fully his natural rights which he brings into the society. Locke does not like Hobbes, identify his society with the State. He insists on a 'national society in which the government is removable at will'. And his government is a representative government. It exists and governs by the common consent—the consent and goodwill of the people. He further maintains that power is really in the people but it is vested and delegated by a majority of them to a government for the special purpose. It is on this philosophy more or less that the practice of the British Parliament is based. Locke may thus be regarded as the father of democracy in the history of nationalism.

Locke's theory, however, has proved to some extent that the contract theory is by no means essential to it. Rousseau, on the contrary, gives a different version of the social contract theory. He also shares the same view with Hobbes in regard to the question of the nature and origin of society, but unlike the latter he suggests that the contract will be fulfilled and its purpose will be served if such a sovereignty is established over the members of the community as a whole. The complete submission of each member with all his rights to the whole community is the best solution for him. Here he introduces the conception of 'General Will'. Each man has his private will and lest there arises a conflict between his private interest and the common one, he should obey that particular part or aspect of his will "which is concerned not

with his immediate interest or satisfaction but with his good on the whole and in the long run". This "Will must be the general will he has as a citizen". True freedom according to him lies in the 'determination of one's own actions by one's own will'. This general will is always right and disinterested since this is a common interest. The general will of the community will be detected by the process of voting in the assembly. But the difficulty that confronts us here is in its practical application. It is observed that in many cases it is the selfish interest of a particular section of the assembly who by whatever means it may be, form the majority group, that is disclosed by the voting process. Besides, Rousseau's theory is also based like that of Hobbes on the unduly assumed psychological premises from which the conclusion can hardly follow. Granting that this difficulty can be made over by the general will, as he thinks, the most puzzling question here is : how to ascertain the general will ? The will is always the will of a person who is by nature egoistic, according to Rousseau.

However, Rousseau asserts an extreme form of democracy denying the representative government of Locke. J. S. Mill was rather conscious of this difficulty. Being afraid, as it were, of the whims and tyranny of the majority, he introduces the '*intellectual elite*' in whom the sovereignty ought to be vested. His doctrine of Liberty is elaborated on the concept of his freedom of thought which is ultimately based upon his principle of Utilitarianism. Almost like Socrates he defends liberty on the ground of 'utility' in the largest sense. His introduction of aristocracy of intellect in the political sphere is, like his psychological doctrine, an advancement on the conception of Bentham, the friend, philosopher and guide to his father, James Mill. Bentham invests sovereignty in the masses. Like Locke he also believes

in the decision of the majority. But as against Locke he proposes not to separate the executive from the legislative. In order to bring the pressure of public opinion on the government he suggests such means as 'universal suffrage', the annual re election of the legislative body etc. He is also of opinion that the government should be a body of delegates rather than of representatives.

The inherent difficulty in this theory lies in the conception of his *quantitative utilitarianism*. It is upon this aspect that Mill makes a positive improvement by suggesting the supremacy of quality over quantity. His psychological theory of 'the superiority of a small quantity of high quality pleasure over a large quantity of low quality pleasure' modifies Bentham's political theory as well. Every individual of a nation, according to Mill, is entitled to vote in the administration of the State, provided he is properly educated before he is allowed to use that vote so that he may use it with judgment and responsibility. The "*experienced few*", as Mill holds, shall be responsible to the nation at large. So the real holders of sovereignty are not the majority group of the assembly, but the intellectual minority in the community. In this sense Mill's "*intellectual few*" who are the controllers of opinion and "who would aim at improving the moral qualities and intellectual capacities of the many, that the many would become capable of taking their share in the government of the community", are as good as Plato's "Guardians".

The Idealist Theory of the State—The concept of State as an organism whose soul is conscious in its citizens and in which the individuals are totally absorbed has been derived from the philosophical Idealism of the Absolutists. According to this theory, the State is 'something real' whose morality is 'Social Righteousness'. It has got a higher

morality than that of the average individual. The originator of this absolutist theory is Hegel ; and much of its offshoots are but the elaborations made by his school. In England, it was popularised by a group of Oxford Philosophers, known as Neo-Hegelians, among whom Green, Bradley and Bosanquet are the most prominent. The theory advocated by these philosophers more or less stands on the rejection of the Social Contract Theory. Burke in course of his criticism of the doctrine of Natural Rights which is closely associated with the Social Contract Theory gives stress on the importance of tradition in a society, ignoring its origin etc. He regards the Natural Rights Theory as a meaningless abstraction having no connection with reality. The character of a Society or Nation, according to him, 'is the result of a large variety of impalpable factors'. It is '*prescription*' and '*custom*' on which the authority of the State is based. The speciality of Burke's conception lies in his introduction of '*presumption*' into the concept of State.

Turning to the German idealism of Hegel which is the source of all the tenets of modern nationalism, it may be pointed out that the foundation of his notion of State lies in his conception of '*Social Rig'teousness*'. Of all thinkers in Germany, Fichte's importance in the history of German nationalism is paramount. He is regarded as 'the apostle of renascent German nation' in the early years of the nineteenth century when the Germans were fighting Napoleon. His view of Liberal Individualism made the German conscious of their solidarity and loyalty to their nation. It was his theory that gave an inspiration to the cosmopolitanism of the '*Enlightenment in Germany*' to be transformed into nationalism. Like Locke, Fichte also holds the same view of State as a means for preserving natural rights, but beyond this negative aspect of the concept of State, he goes further and maintains that in some spheres, especially in the economic

sphere, an active and positive intervention of the State is necessary to enforce these rights. He got this inspiration, as the historians think, from Robespierre's attempt in France, for putting into practice the socialist elements in Rousseau's theory for the benefit of the '*Fourth Estate*.' In his early treatise he gives out the idea of the State as a means only and not an end in itself; but subsequently he develops the idea of State upon a national basis which he considers the highest good. However, his notion of nation-state, strictly speaking, is inconsistent with his individualist premise. In his conclusion, he, of course, arrives at the Hegelian idea of the ultimate reality of the State as the highest embodiment of the Spirit of Reason, but it is not consistent like Hegel's theory.

Kant draws a distinction between what *is* and what *ought to be*. The moral laws, according to him, are deductions from the nature of Reason itself. Morality for him consists in "the exercise of the free will in accordance with the dictates of the moral imperative" and this Hegel rejects on the ground of its being individualistic and subjective. Hegel holds a *via media* position between the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism. The moral obligation, according to him, does not reside "exclusively in the state of mind, nor in a legal code, but in something which embraces and transcends both of them." And this something is *Social Righteousness*. By the dialectical process of the evolution of mind he has attempted to show its history as evolving, 'towards a fuller consciousness of itself and a fuller freedom', in which its determining laws are its own creation. Like Burke, he also thinks of the laws of the State as 'the product of the whole past history of the people accumulated in the form of conventions, customs and constitutional laws, and not as 'a product of the sovereign will of the people expressed in the legislative assembly', as Rousseau maintains. Thus, the history of mind, for Hegel, is the history of the world. This in essence, is his Philosophy of History. He has derived

much of his political ideas from Rousseau, his immediate ancestor, and as such, he accepts Rousseau's idea that 'moral freedom consists in obedience to the laws enacted by General Will' ; but he differs from him in the concept of General Will. The laws of the State, according to him, "are not merely the highest, but the only concrete expression of the moral laws" in the obedience to which lies the true freedom of individuals, and thus cannot be the laws of their own making. They are handed down to them from past generations as modelled and 'revised from time to time by enlightened bureaucrats'. It is on this ground that he rejects also the Kantian doctrine of the universal validity of moral laws from the standard of which individuals are capable of judging the merits and demerits of the individuals and the State. Individuals have got no independent existence of their own apart from that of the State.

Thus the necessary conclusions following from this idealist theory are that the individuals can attain freedom only through their respective services to the State and that the State is not bound by morality. "The State", says Bosanquet, "is the guardian of our whole moral world and not a factor in our organized moral world." The relation between the individuals and the State is but the relation existing between the parts and the whole of the organism. The State has been endowed with divine attributes. The State has been conceived by Hegel as *actual God*, and hence it being the natural, necessary and final form of human organization, has got no moral obligation to other States. War, according to Hegel, is necessary for settling the international problems. "Successful wars", says he, "have prevented civil broils and strengthened the internal powers of the State". Further he adds, "by war people escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous and eternal peace". (Hegel's Philosophy of Right). It is not the theories of aggressive nationalism alone like

Fascism and National Socialism of Germany which have arisen as a logical development of the implication of this Hegelian theory, but it may be remarked without any prejudice that the principles of almost all the forms of modern nationalism find their footings on Hegel's basic theme. It is not only Machievelli's expression "no consideration of justice or injustice, of honour and dishonour, can find a place" at the time "when the safety of the country is at stake", that is found embedded in this conception, but also the source of the English sentiment of "*My country right or wrong*" can be traced to this origin.

Criticism :—Now, the fundamental proposition of the idealist theory that the State is the final form of human organization is dogmatic in its character. We may arrive in future and as a matter of fact, we have already arrived, in a sense, at the conception of such a *Unit* as will liquidate the idea of the absoluteness and sovereignty of the nation-State. The realization of such a unit will prove that the problems of a State cannot be solved without considering its relation with other States. Moreover, the analogy of a living body with the State is, logically speaking, a very bad analogy. Further, there is no justification for the application of the *a priori* principles of Metaphysics to political and ethical spheres. Politics and, to some extent, Ethics are concerned with human desires intentions, motives, historical circumstances etc., and as such deal with the practical affairs of human life. But the metaphysical truths on which the idealist grounds his political theory are *a priori* principles and hence theoretical. These truths have little bearing upon human conduct which is moulded on different occasions by multifarious historical environments. Hence it seems that the '*oughtness*' of the State is too much a dogmatic assertion. Besides this absoluteness of the State has taken its shape into a menacing form of dictatorship in the nation-States. Once it is accepted that the claims of the State are *a priori* the best of all other claims, and that

they are to be accepted as such because they are the claims of the State, freedom and justice in human society is jeopardised. This principle of nationalism is bound to breed either Imperialism or Fascism.

Fascism, if considered theoretically, owes its origin not so much to any other doctrine as to Nietzsche's Ethics. Nietzsche's theory of morality rests on the disbelief in the ideal of equality. Such an ideal, for him, is a myth. Human beings are not equal. He considers the utilitarian morality as the herd-instinct in the individual. Morality, according to him, arises out of fear. The fittest ought to survive, the higher type should dominate the lower—and this he derives from the observed facts of the doctrine of Evolution, as discovered by Darwin. It is in respect of the '*will to power*' that the superior type of individual in the nation is to be distinguished from the mass; and hence he maintains that the superior type in whom this mark of higher morality is present, must dominate—they *ought* to dominate. How to test the superiority? The answer is: by force, by successful war. Fascism, both of its Nazi form and the Italian form is embodied in Nietzschean principle. The only distinction between the Nazi Ethics and the Italian Fascist Ethics that can be drawn, is that the attitude of the former to truth is purely pragmatic or relativistic; whereas the latter maintains the absolute existence of a moral law. To a Fascist, like a Hegelian, the State is absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative. In the interest of the welfare of the State, the Nazi theory demands sacrifices of free thought free criticism, free imagination etc. This, in short, is the principle of *Totalitarianism*. Its principle of Dictatorship may be said to have been derived from the Platonic principle of leadership, no doubt, but it has not adopted the Platonic devices for determining the leaders. The leader in the Fascist State is almost self-appointed.

Like a Hindu Avatara he appears, and he is to be recognised by some marks—both spiritual and mental. He has a more dominant will than the led; he knows the moral law. And this leader in order to conduct his office and exert his power selects by his choice some of his loyal followers. Plato's Guardians, on the contrary, are endowed with intellectual attainments, which are positively disliked in the Fascist State, and thus they are wise and are in the office not because of *choice* but because of *duty*.

The Fascist theory, with some modification, is the immediate source of the present German nationalism. As a philosophy of action it stands against individualism and democracy. Its opposition to the basic principles of Marxism in particular to class-war, internationalism and the confiscation of property, is another special feature of this nationalism. It transfers all the weapons of political and economic powers to the State. It is opposed to both Marxism and Capitalism.

Its attitude towards the liberal democracy is manifested not only on account of its inherent doctrine on which it is based, but also of some historical facts. One of such facts is the so-called 'democratic peace' out of the Treaty of Versailles, which has filled in the defeatist minds of the German nationalists with hatred and spur. This is why the Parliamentary system of the British bureaucracy is always the object of scathing criticism from German leaders. Herr Hitler has remarked, in his *Mein Kampf*, "we are opponents of a sham democracy, which treats clever and foolish alike. We see in the present system of majority votes the main cause of our steadily growing decay". Another important cause of this connection between the growth of aggressive nationalism and the break-down of democracy may be said to be due to the fact of its recency in the origin and growth of this nationalism. Because of their comparatively recent origin, as the critics remark, these nation-States have always been confronted

with obstructions and disunity, and have consequently adopted the different forms of Dictatorship in order 'to produce adequate cohesion in the State'. Great Britain, France and several other smaller countries of Western Europe have formed up their nationhood through a long and gradual process of development and have thus been able to achieve their end through peace and harmony. At least, they have been able to maintain a liberal democracy in their own homes, though not in their Colonies and seized countries. Such is not the case with Central and Eastern Europe, where the problems of adjustment and readjustment of its frontiers and 'territorial revision' are acute. The Balkan States stand as an illustration. This is why, it may be remarked, Dictatorship flourishes somewhere at the cost of democracy.

Its revolt against individualism is only a form of this reactionism. The sacrifice of the freedom of the individual for the freedom of nation has also been put to practice in the world of action. In Industry, the individual craftsmanship has been replaced by mass production. Mechanised unit has occupied the place of heroes of battlefield. Hence it is quite natural that the Fuehrer will believe in violence and not in persuasion or compromise. These constitute the aggressive nature of German Nationalism which has specially developed after the last Great War.

Apart from the dire consequences of this dangerous philosophy of 'might is right' upon the life and civilization of the world, the individual social life in Germany, owing to its baleful influence has taken a new shape. Under the present regime of Hitler the educational institutions are governed by a Minister-in-Charge, who is to control the system and determine the curriculum in such a fashion as they are able to produce citizens trained in the principles of Totalitarianism. School education is chiefly concentrated for the production of military

efficiency. The Universities are coloured with racial prejudices. They have become the 'educational barracks' for the Aryans only. The highest ideal that is put before the women of Germany is their privilege to send their children to war. There is no distinction between a citizen and a soldier. "A citizen and a soldier", says Mussolini, "are synonymous in the Fascist State." Art, literature, science, philosophy, religion—nothing is allowed to function independently of the State.¹

The effect that this nationalism has already produced in the external world is simply disastrous. It arose out of Great War and terminates in Greater War, if not the Greatest. It has threatened the life of civilization of the West and has threatened with ruins and debris, with pestilence, devastations and poverty. The cracks of bombs and the drones of bombers have not only caused palpitation and an ultimate collapse of the heart of the metropolis but have also shattered the nerves of the hamlets in meadows 'far from the madding crowd'. To put it in the language of Goad, 'the growth in power of national States is one of the greatest menaces to man's happiness. Like the gods of old, they are jealous, violent and revengeful..... They are the gods; the officers of the army and navy are their high priests, the people their sacrifice' (Guide to the Phil. etc. p. 768).

Here an important question may be raised in the following manner: Should we then dethrone Nationalism as such? Or is it true that the menacing effect that is said to have been or is being produced by nationalism is applicable to all forms of nationalism? The description of the consequences given above is that of an 'aggressive' or a 'bad' nationalism. But there is

(1) Herr Goebbels has pointed out that "so long as there remains in Germany any neutral or non-political art our task is not ended."

another form of nationalism, which is 'passive' and 'good'. And our answer to this is that we do not find any sufficient reason to distinguish between nationalism and nationalism, between 'aggressive' and 'passive' nationalism. In the previous analysis of the development of Political theories out of which these different nationalisms have evolved, we have attempted to show how the principle of 'Totalitarianism' has been originated and aggravated by the theories of Rousseau, Fichte, Hegel and Nietzsche. The so-called Liberal Democracy of Great Britain is nothing but a theory which is established on Hegelian Idealism as admirably mixed up with its racial characteristic of empiricism. France's democracy is simply a reflection of the spirit of Rousseau through the mirror of French Revolution. The source of inspirations of both these forms—dictatorship and democracy, 'aggressive' and 'passive' is almost the same. The perceptible difference that exists between them is the difference in the application of their respective methods only. But this is not an inherent difference inasmuch as it arises out of certain historical circumstances of which the Peace of Versailles is of paramount importance, as it has already been referred to. M. Van den Bruck wrote a few years before in his 'Germany's 'Third Empire':—"The Peace of Versailles will result in such an exposure of liberalism in the eyes of all the world that liberalism will be unable to survive it." And how far the remark is true is quite well known to us now. Further, it is a question of time in the history of civilization that twists the shape of this aggressive or passive nature of nationalism. Historically speaking, the first period of European nationalism is marked by the break-up of feudalism and the victory of capitalism and the second by Imperialism—to speak, in the language of Stalin—"when capitalism in its search for markets, raw materials, fuel and cheap labour power and in the competition for the export of capital and possession of the great rail and sea routes, breaks out of the confines of

the national state and extends its territory at the expense of near and distant neighbours."

So, we find that the aggressiveness of the nation-states of those countries ceased or could not develop, which by virtue of the conquest of new territories, became the 'multi national colony-owning States.' But it is also true that though the aggressiveness could not or did not develop in their own respective home-countries, yet its biting sting was not inoperative in so far as the seized countries were concerned. It is difficult to maintain as some thinkers do, that yet the nature of that nationalism was not so menacing and baleful as the aggressive form and that its ultimate motive was peace by means of compromise.²

Granting that the clashes were 'adjusted peacefully' as some historians remark, the same principle of inequality of Totalitarianism reigns here also supreme. It did reign and still does. The clashes and disputes could have been peacefully adjusted because the world of the 19th cent. was quite different from that of the 20th. The earth was less crowded and the natives' of the conquered lands were not educated or clever enough to read the unclean soul of Imperialism. What was possible for the White Hall to convince and pacify the Indians in the 19th cent. by hoax and cajoling, is not possible now. Every nook and corner of today's earth, however backward it may be, is trying, if not has succeeded, to keep pace with the incredible velocity with which this planet runs. The so-called peace and happiness over which the imperialist propaganda is trumpeting, is only due to the complete control of lives and

(2) "The history of colonial development in Africa does not seem an edifying one.....The only consoling thought is that the disputes, though acrimonious, were usually adjusted peacefully." (Grant and Temperley, *Europe in the 19th & 20th centuries* p. 404).

properties of the subject-nations. And this complete control has been achieved simply because Imperialism started to exploit first. Then wherein lies the distinction? The very basis of imperialistic nationalism is grounded on the assumption that there are inferior races of 'lesser breeds without the law' over whom the white race is destined to rule. Where is the distinction between this principle and the principle of Nietzsche? Racial theories are the ingredient parts of nationalism both of the 'aggressive' and the so-called 'passive' forms. It is inherent in the very nature of nationalism, whether it is a form of the 19th cent. or 20th; and hence it is of no use denying the fact that the 19th cent. nationalism was as militant as that in the 20th cent.

Members of the study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs have very nicely explained, in their Report entitled 'Nationalism', the apparent change in the character of nationalism in the 20th cent. It is 'attributed to three main factors, all of which', they observe, 'had begun to make themselves felt before the War, (the last Great War) and have been further intensified by it'. The three factors according to them are:— (1) 'The popularization of State; (2) the increase in power and activity of governments; (3) the intensification of international rivalries' (p. 170). The Report has further analysed and shown most successfully how the "increase in population has broadened the base of the State and the rise in the general level of education has fitted men to take part in the formulation of government policy and has stimulated them to do so." Further, owing to the scientific industrialization, the prosperity of both the middle and working classes of the nation has been increased which has evidently raised their standard of life. Hence the popularization of the nation is due to the popularization of the State. This factor has affected the nature and

scope of Government policy. To affect the extent, course and direction of external trade is one of its direct policies. Thus, in order to obtain a permanent foreign market there is a desire to obtain political control of external territories. And all this could have happened quite peacefully without any clash whatsoever, in the 19th cent., but it is not so possible now owing to the intensive growth of international rivalries. Here the conflict arises and the national feeling is heightened. The feeling takes the virulent form in those nations which are the worst sufferers because of their later origin and development. So we see that the growth of modern nationalism is causally connected with economic weakness. The intolerance of nationalism grew out of economic depression that was accelerated by the last War. Germany being unable to stand this intensified competition after war was the first country to resort to economic nationalism.*

To sum up, it can hence be said that the present aggressive character, which is found in some forms of nationalism in this century is but a necessary historical development of the very principle of nationalism as grown up in the midst of pernicious environment of Western civilization, and that the question of distinction between the good and bad nationalism

3. The Report has adduced two other reasons for the dangerous character of intensive national feeling. It says, "In the first place the disappearance of 'empty spaces' makes it more and more likely that the need for expansion does tempt nation-States to enlarge the territories over which they have control, they will do so not at the expense of weak or primitive countries, which are unable to offer serious resistance, but at the expense of their equals and that the endeavour will lead to war' (Ibid p. 186). The second reason is also obvious and that is the application of mechanical and scientific methods to war.

is a question of degree and time only. To-day we are sorry for the loss of Netherlands and the defeat of Belgium. We shed tears over France's capitulation; but glancing back over the history—how they snatched away peace and liberty of the natives of East Indies and how they lorded over the black Nigers of Congo and Algeria,—will it be too much on our part to remark that this is nothing but paying back in their own coins? Time is the judge to give verdict to all actions. Herr Hitler is simply a symbol or instrument. What is 'passive' or 'good' in relation to one country is 'aggressive' or 'bad' in relation to the other. Or what was aggressive before has become passive now and what is passive to-day may be aggressive a decade after. Caporetto and Versailles have given birth to Mussolini and Hitler, but who knows what London peace will produce, if there be any such peace!

What is the Remedy?—Is there no remedy then to this menacing evil? In one word the answer is perhaps in the negative. Modern nationalism is a necessary evil of modern civilization. Almost all thinkers are unanimous in their opinion that this nationalism is 'incompatible.' But, we add—nationalism as such is incompatible with human civilization. Our previous analysis has, we believe, been able to show how nationalism originated and developed on human psychology of instinct, interest and motive and that the present phase of menacing type of nationalism is but a development of the same principle in and through certain internal and external historical environments. In all forms, nationalism is almost identified with economic imperialism. But whence do all those economic and historical environments of the West grow? Certainly they have originated from education, culture and philosophy of the society. In other words they are the products of its civilization, which has been completely industrialized so much so that it does not unde-

stand anything except in terms of cash and currency notes.⁴

This nationalism is born out of the womb of this civilization and has, so long, been and is still her nursling. The horrible buzz of Blitzkrieg, Spitfires and Hurricanes is nothing but her own echo. We all have grown nervous thinking that the world civilization is going to collapse, that the clarion call of this war is sounding her death knell. Yes, it is true, — doomed she must be. Her collapse is inevitable, and the sooner she does, the better for the human race. How can she survive when she is seated on the very basis of dualism—the differentiation between man and man, between race and race? So, however incompatible and threatening it may be, the menacing phase of such nationalism is a necessary logical consequence of this civilization. It is bound to affect the individuals, who are in it and behind it. How can we do away with it unless, of course, nationalism is detached from this culture and civilization? But is it possible? Some thinkers of the age are of opinion that the task is, though difficult, neither impracticable nor impossible. And they suggest the remedy in the prospective new order of the world.

Mr. H. G. Wells sees the vision of this 'New World Order' in the new and complete Revolution by which he neither means 'an explosion nor a *coup d'état*.' This, for him, is not 'Catholic type of Revolution.' By this he means 'the Triangle of Socialism, Law and Knowledge.'⁵

4. Prof. H. Laski has nicely remarked in his own usual manner, "Civilization came to depend upon mechanism so delicate and so inter-related that a boom on the Stock-Exchange of New York might alter the habits of life of a Balkan peasant" (The Danger of Being a Gentleman, pp. 191-92).

5. He describes it as '(a) outright world-socialism, scientifically planned and directed, plus (b) a sustained

But the real difficulty arising in the way to realizing the vision of Wells is with regard to its application. How such a peaceful Revolution of Wells can take place when education, press, radio, cinema and all other instruments of propaganda are under the control of the ruling class? Unless the imperialist hands are off from all these institutions of the society, all these ideas will remain as ideas only. Moreover, what Wells suggests is the moderation of the nationalism and not its 'neutralization'. It is futile to attempt to take nationalism out of politics by intellectual or moral convictions that national wars are not well advised or that such wars are wrong. If 'Revolution' is suggested it is the Bolshevik Revolution that seems to be the proper suggestion.

Prof. Laski suggests Internationalism as the only alternative to this menace of nationalism. "We must learn," says he, "to think internationally or we perish" (*The Danger of Being a Gentleman* p.198). He 'neutralizes' all acuteness of nationalism to Internationalism. In his 'Nationalism and the Future of Civilization' he has attempted to establish the idea of a non-sovereign state as something real. And this is possible, as he thinks, in the actual facts of international life. Here, "Nationalism" as he believes, can be fully satisfied without flowing into the channels of sovereignty" (Ibid p 201).

What Prof. Laski suggests here is the ultimate appeal to reason and a League of Nations. But we are all aware of the birth and death of such a league during this short period of

insistence upon law, as based on a fuller, more jealously conceived restatement of the personal Rights of Man plus (c) the completest freedom of speech, criticism and publication and a sedulous expansion of the educational organization to the ever-growing demands of the new order" (*The New World Order*-P. 119).

twenty years after the last War. We know how it disappeared like efflorescence. And who signed the death-warrant of this Council of League? All that is left in the Park Ariana at Geneva is a grand stately 'palais' haunted by ghosts, and why? To all this Prof. Laski shall answer—because it was 'a League of Sovereign States.' But how this non-sovereign-States-League can be formed? What must be the means or method of such attainment? In the last League, it has been observed that its problems were *ipso facto* the problems between Governments, which, when solved, always stood in favour of some only and not all. As a matter of fact such solution could not favour all, more so when the League was suspected from many quarters as standing only for the morality convenient to those states, which dominated it. Why did it tolerate Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and why it could not enforce 'sanctions' against Italy in her way to Abyssinia? The reason is not far to seek—because the powers that controlled it were based on such a social system that in the interest of the States they did not desire a new world. Their motto was to retain the privileged *status quo*. And hence their method was a method of compromise on everything and in all circumstances without facing the real issues. The '*esprit de Geneva*' was thus a spirit of self-deception and make-believe. Still Prof. Laski will invoke this spirit. He says, "But state the case against the League at its very worst, it would yet be true, like, the God of Voltaire, that if it did not exist we should have to invent it. To make it function in a full and continuous way is necessary to our survival as a civilization." (Ibid—p. 201).

The idea of this Internationalism, of course, may be said to be plausible, if we understand it in the sense of Communism. It is in this sense, we believe, that Prof. Laski has also meant as we get the hint from his appeal for an 'economically equal

society' in order to prevent the perversion of national sentiment. ⁶

The authors of 'Nationalism' have concluded their Report by suggesting that the 'neutralization' of nationalism is possible "through a fundamental change in the basis of political organization, i. e., the transference of political power and control over wealth to some kind of political group other than the nation" (Nationalism, p. 338). As to the nature of this group Marxism is the only suggestion. Thus Communism or Marxism seems to be the only alternative left to us.

Marxism is anti-national and mainly internationalist in spirit though such a spirit can hardly be said to have been concretized as yet in Soviet Russia. Marx, though after all originally a Hegelian, distinguishes himself from Hegel in respect of his materialistic conception. His Dialectical Materialism agrees with the Logical Dialecticism of Hegel in so far as it holds that 'the development of both thought and things is brought about through a conflict of opposing elements or tendencies.' But unlike Hegel, Marx maintains that the driving force of the dialectical process is not the ideas themselves or mental but a physical event or material. Mind, according to him, is to be understood as a 'reflection of the

6. The hint of such a class-less society has also been indirectly given by Sir. S. Radhakrishnan, when he has suggested to fight "the sick acquisitive society with its balance of power and uncoordinated economic enterprise and the unjust social order, where the pride and prosperity of a few is built upon the shame and subjection of many and the unjust international order, which acquiesces in the degradation of any nation." (Vide-Presidential Address in the 15th All India Educational Conference held at Lucknow, in December, 1939).

environment in which it operates.' It is on the metaphysical basis of Marx that Communism repudiates the absolute validity of the State and thus comes into conflict with all the claims of the nation-States. Democracy, religion, morality, freedom, and all such tall-talks are, for a communist, but 'the opium of the people.' Real democracy can not be enjoyed, where there is no equal economic security, which by no means can be had in a capitalist society. Hence 'political democracy is the shadow without the substance'.

Logically speaking the materialist view of causation can hardly give a satisfactory explanation to the nature and origin of mind. Besides this, the deduction of political philosophy from a priori metaphysical truth, as we have pointed out before, is not justifiable. Apart from this philosophical consideration, the theory is not free from practical difficulties. The revolution it suggests, is wholly destructive in so far as the application of its method is concerned. From the ethical standpoint such a destructive means cannot be supported however bright and good its end may be. Further, whether the power invested in the communist dictators during this transitional revolutionary period shall be ultimately relinquished by them voluntarily or not is an important question. The State, for a communist, is a temporary institution, which is to be utilised only during the transition period of revolution. Engels says, "So long as the proletariat needs the State, it needs it not in the interest of freedom, but in order to suppress its opponents; when it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the State as such ceases to exist." This is also the formula of Marx's 'withering away' of the State. During this revolutionary period, which Lenin calls a 'quasi-state' Communism believes in the application of force which is delegated to the dictator. But from the view points of both history and psychology it may be remarked that this dictatorship increases its intensity to such an extent as it is unable to forsake the

power once ~~has~~ has enjoyed in its possession. Further, it has been pointed out by many that Marx's prediction of the superseding of the Nation by class has not yet fructified and hence there is no justification for the optimism of the bright future.

But, this much may be concluded that with all the fallacies and defects in Marxism it is worth experimenting at least, unprecedented in history as it is. The equality of status of man and the economic justice that it wants to bring in on this earth is a great hope and consolation for the human race. 'Making no distinction between whites and blacks,' says Stalin, "between Europeans and Asiatics, between the 'civilized' and the 'uncivilized' slaves of imperialism, Leninists link up the national question with the colonial question. Thereby the national question has been broadened out, so that it is no longer the private concern of any one nation, but is a general and international concern" (Vide—Lectures delivered at the Sverdlov University in April, 1924).

In conclusion what we want to envisage is that we do not disbelieve that the equality the theory demands may be obtained by the realization of this principle, but we are convinced more in man's *attitude* and the *outlook*. It is his attitude not only towards his neighbours or other members of his family but also towards his own self which is the crux of all problems. Unless the general vision of the whole human race is changed for the better, however force or codes of statute books may be applied, an absolute equality or peace or tranquility remains an ideal only, or if attained it will last for a short period only. It may be attained, ~~and as such can not be attained~~, we believe, in and through the culmination of the spirit and not the body. It is on the choice of 'the good' (sreyah) or 'the pleasant' (preyah) that the vitality of a civilization depends and not otherwise. However international its policy may be, if it chooses the latter as its basic principle, it is bound to perish

The whole of its international construction of Reason, in that case, is sure to collapse by any strong gale of emotion or passion.

Comment on Mr. J. F. Butler's Paper :—

Mr. Butler's short analysis of the doctrine of nationalism is highly suggestive and illuminating ; and we can not but agree with him on various points. But what we want to comment on his observations are as follows :

Mr. Butler has remarked by way of his observation that the 'basis of nationalism is a sentiment, and not a necessary one'. What the writer actually means by the word 'sentiment' is not clear. If by 'sentiment' he (i) means the ordinary dictionary meaning of the term in which we usually use it, it will be improper for him to ground nationalism on such a loose and unsound basis. Though feeling or emotion is found to be the immediate source of the outburst of nationalism, yet it may be pointed out, on a further analysis, that it is well-grounded on some logico-empirical concepts, however vague they may be. Nationalism need not be misunderstood as a cheap doctrine of sentiment or feeling, which is but a passing phase in human life, though feeling, as we have pointed out in our own writing, is a necessary factor in the formation of a nation. (ii) Or, if by 'sentiment' he means the abstract impersonal complex feeling, in which it is used in Psychology, we fail to understand how he calls it 'not necessary'. A sentiment in this sense arising as it does out of the contemplation of abstract ideals, is necessarily conducted by the instinctive urges which are but a priori necessary forms in human understanding. If man is essentially a social animal, as the writer also opines, is not then this social instinct on which the social organizations are based, a necessary factor ? Whether such an instinct was also originally implanted by God in the mind of Adam, or it has been

imbibed by us, by laws of heredity, is not our question here. What we are concerned here with is the problem : How best we can form our society in which we are born, die, and have our being. And this, we believe, is a necessary idea of man as a social being. Moreover, if the meaning of logical necessity is pushed further, and transferred into the transcendental world, nothing, in that sense, is necessary. The consciousness of the body itself is also not necessary for the existence of Soul, and what of its social consciousness ! But human social life is a life in the empirical world and the necessary concepts of this world are also necessary in this life.

Secondly, we do not find any justification for drawing any distinction, as Mr. Butler has done, between political philosophy and politics. Politics is a practical normative science, and as such it must be based on some theory. Art or practice necessarily presupposes theory or knowledge according to which the scheme will be applied. However imperfectly a theory may be applied to the situation concerned, politics of every country or age is always based on some general principle or philosophy.

Comment on Prof. A. R. Wadia's Paper :—

Prof. Wadia's learned paper is an inspiration to us for its novelty of thought and lucidity of its expression. We agree with the Professor that we can hardly suggest any logical definition of nationalism owing to its wide scope and complexity of nature. We also concur with him that the implications of the nation like common ancestry, religion, language, etc. are not the necessary factors implied in nationalism, as he has observed in his analysis on the concept of nation. But what we want to envisage, as we have done in our paper, is that none of these implications, if taken separately, is certainly a necessary factor in the formation of a nation. But this does not mean that their composition is equally barren. As a matter

of fact, it can hardly be denied that all these factors taken together constitute the very ground of nationalism. —

Another point of our observation on his paper is with regard to his suggestion in his conclusion of a *'league of large federated unions'*. "A league of large federated unions", says he, "may succeed where the old League of Nations failed so miserably." But the greatest difficulty with which we are confronted here is with regard to its practical application. How and by whom shall such a league be formed? Without going into details, the Professor believes in the application of this general principle which the world so badly needs today,—but how is it possible? Ultimately an appeal is to be made to reason. But the sophisticated human reason can hardly establish such federation on the basis of pure justice and freedom. And history as a witness will bear out the truth of this pessimistic judgment of ours. Communism as the only alternative left to us, is also not free from danger and defect, as we have already noted in our paper.

Prof. Wadia's reference to 'Humanity' is, we are afraid, of little value to human beings at large. Mahatma Gandhi has asked Great Britain to ground her arms and fall out; and the world knows what fruitful effect this piece of advice has produced in the fighting world. It might move the heart of a particular soldier but it failed to reach the heart of the race—and why? It is on this earth that Buddha, Jesus, and Caitanya were born, but it remains the same old, old earth moving on in the same direction. Is there any way out of it?

On Causality

What the Scientists Have to Say
about

CAUSALITY & DETERMINISM

By

Prof. SHYAMA CHARAN

“We can hardly imagine any experimental facts which would finally decide whether nature is absolutely determined or is partially determined. The most that can be decided is whether the one or the other concept leads to the simpler and cleaner survey of all the observed facts.”—*Schroedinger*.

In classical mechanics the past and future paths and velocities of a moving body can be found if its position, velocity and the forces acting upon it at a given time are known. Thus, for example, the future paths and velocities of the planets can be calculated in advance with the help of Dynamical Astronomy.

Recent advances in physics have forced the scientists to invent new physical concepts. It has been discovered that matter has granular structure ; it is composed of atoms—the elementary quanta of matter. The electric charges and energy—from the point of view of *quantum* theory—have also a granular structure. Light too is composed of photons — quanta of energy.

Is Light a wave or a shower of photons? Is a beam of electrons a shower of elementary particles of a wave? These fundamental questions have entirely changed the point of view of modern physics.

"Let us, for the sake of briefness, call everything except quantum physics, classical physics. Classical and quantum physics differ radically. Classical physics aims at a description of objects existing in space, and the formulation of laws governing their change in time. But the phenomena revealing the particle and wave nature of matter and radiation, the apparently statistical character of elementary events such as radioactive disintegration, diffraction, emission of spectral lines and many others forced us to give up this view. Quantum physics does not aim at the description of individual objects in space and their change in time. There is no place in quantum physics for such statements as: 'This object is so-and-so, and has this-and-this property.' Instead we have statements of this kind: 'There is such-and-such a probability that the individual object is so-and-so and has this-and-this property.' There is no place in quantum physics for laws governing the changes in time of the individual object. Instead, we have laws governing the change in time of the probability. Only this fundamental change, brought into physics by the quantum theory, made possible an adequate explanation of the apparently discontinuous and statistical character of events in the realm of phenomena in which the elementary quanta of matter and radiation reveal their existence." *Einstein and Infeld—The Evolution of Physics.*

The entire point of view of physics has been changed by the discovery of the so-called *principle of uncertainty* by Werner Heisenberg. It has led some scientists and phi-

losophers to suggest that the movements of atoms and electrons are just as indeterminate as human nature !

This *uncertainty* is characteristic of quantum physics and states among other things that the measurement of an electron's velocity is inaccurate in proportion as the measurement of its position in space is accurate and vice versa.

It has been found that every experimental method which permits of an exact measurement of the electron's position does not lead to an exact measurement of its velocity. Further it has been discovered that the consequent inaccuracy in the measurement of its velocity varies inversely with the accuracy in the measurement of its position and vice versa.

This phenomenon is governed by a law which is *accurately* defined in terms of Planck's quantum constant h , where $h = 6.555 \times 10^{-27}$ seconds-ergs.

From this law it follows that if the position of an electron is known accurately, its velocity is not known at all and vice versa.

".....the product of the uncertainties in the position and speed of an electron is 0.73. As an instance, if one discovers that an electron is within a hundredth of a centimeter at a certain point, by allowing it to flash on a screen, the speed of its motion will be uncertain to at least 73 centimeters of a second. If, again, the speed is determined within 7 centimeters of a second, the position will be uncertain to one tenth of a centimeter and so on An infinitely long train of waves would be required to specify the speed of motion of an electron with perfect precision, and this long train implies an uncertainty of infinite amount regarding the position of the electron. On the other hand, an infinitely short train of waves represents an electron, the position of which can be specified with

precision, but the wave length and, in consequence, the momentum and speed of motion are indefinite."—*Davidson : Free Will or Determinism.*

It is not hard to discover the reason for these uncertainties. To measure the velocity we must measure s , the distance through which the electron moves during a short interval of time t . The ratio s/t , when t is made as small as possible gives its velocity. This is not the velocity when the electron was in its first position at the beginning of the time interval t , but gives the average velocity between the two positions. Hence when the position is accurately determined, its velocity cannot be determined at the same time, and vice versa.

Moreover, we can find the position of a moving electron only if we can see it, and hence it must be illuminated by a beam of light. The photons of these light rays come into collision with the electron and thus alter its velocity in a way which is impossible to calculate. The more accurately it is desired to determine the position of the electron, the shorter must be the light waves employed to illuminate it, the stronger will be the impact, and the greater the inaccuracy with which the velocity is determined.

In spite of these uncertainties is it not marvellous that their product¹ is *accurately determinable* in terms of the Planck's constant h ?

Because of these uncertainties, some scientists and philosophers say, the application of the causal connections here must be abandoned. On the other hand, whether or not the causal connection be true in reality, is a question that has no meaning for the physicist, for the simple reason that in atomic physics he cannot apply it.

"The question is how we can harmonise the consciousness of *free will* which is alive in us, and which is closely associated with the responsibilities of our actions, with the

conviction that every happening is causally determined—which appears to set us free from all responsibility. The difficulty of finding a satisfactory answer to this question is shown by the fact that there are to-day eminent physicists who think that the law of causality must be sacrificed in order to save free will, and therefore do not hesitate to use the familiar relation of uncertainty of quantum mechanics—which they take as an infraction of the law of causality—in order to explain free will. It is true that they furnish no reply to the question how the assumption of blind chance is to be made compatible with the sense of moral responsibility.”—*Max Plank : The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics.*

If electrons are governed by chance and move about at random, it does not at all follow that the *human mind* is also governed by chance. The behaviour of most of the sane persons can be predicted within reasonable limits. From heredity, environment and past history it can always be ascertained how any particular person will react to various suggestions. Study of the history of a nation is entirely based on the character and behaviour patterns of the so called historical personages. *Erratic* leaders have been known to wreck kingdoms and societies.

Another uncertainty in the movements of the electrons is their apparent *erratic* habit of jumping from one possible orbit to another round the central nucleus of an atom. There are no means available of ascertaining *which* of the several electrons circulating round the nucleus will jump from their orbits. But from statistical considerations it can always be foretold fairly accurately *how many* are going to jump their orbits within a certain specified time.

In atomic physics billions and billions of electrons are involved in any action. Mass mathematics or statistical methods have to be used when dealing with such huge

crowds. In employing classical mechanics, the positions, velocities and the forces acting upon every individual electron of this mass at any given epoch have to be ascertained. This is an impossible task and perforce the methods of classical mechanics have to be replaced by statistical methods. But it does not mean that the principle of causality no longer holds good. We are only unable to discover it, and apply it to the individual electrons. The validity of statistical laws is entirely compatible with a strict causality.

"It is true," Schroedinger said, "that in practice we had to forego the use of causality even within that aspect of nature that was based on classical mechanics. To me personally the fact is connected in my mind with a very deep impression that I received as a young man when I heard the inaugural address delivered by Fritz Hasenoechl of whom an untimely fate robbed us in the war, and to whom I owe my whole scientific outlook. It would not contradict the laws of nature, Hasenoechl declared, if this piece of wood should lift itself into the air without any ostensible cause. According to the mechanical aspect of nature such a miracle, being a reversion of the opposite process, would not be impossible but only extremely unlikely. Yet the concept of probability being involved in the laws of nature, which Hasenoechl had in his mind when he used these words, does not really contradict the causal postulate. Uncertainty in this case arises only from the practical impossibility of determining the initial state of a body composed of billions of atoms." *Schroedinger—Science and the Human Temperament.*

It seems that in the external world a certain regularity prevails, the observation of which leads one to the very useful and practical concept of a necessary causal connection between one natural event and another.

In recent times the existence of this regularity has been questioned. "The question at issue is this : given any physical system, is it possible, at any rate in theory, to make an exact prediction of its future behaviour, provided that its nature and condition at one given point of time are exactly known ? It is assumed of course that no external and unforeseen influences act upon the system from without... According to the new theory, identical conditions at the beginning do not invariably lead to identical results ; all that they lead to is identical statistics ; i. e. the relative frequency of the various possible events ; indeed this is precisely what we mean by indeterminateness." *Schroedinger—Science and Human Temperament.*

It was least expected that a branch of exact science like physics would be the one to demonstrate this irregularity. Now a great many of phenomena occurring in the domain of physical and chemical sciences are found to be due to the mass actions of innumerable single individual entities known as atoms, electrons and molecules. It has also been discovered that the marvellously precise and exact regularity which is observed in these processes is entirely due to one general law—the progressive increase of disorder in nature.

"In every physical and chemical process there is a transition from relatively well-ordered conditions among the groups of atoms and molecules to less orderly conditions—in other words, a transition from order to disorder, just as might be expected if an individual member of the mass followed its own way more or less without any plan and under no definite law. The exact laws which we observe are 'statistical laws'. In each mass phenomenon these laws appear all the more clearly, the greater the number of individuals that co-operate in the phenomenon. And the statistical laws are even more clearly manifested when

the behaviour of each individual entity is *not* strictly determined, but conditioned only by chance. It is quite understandable that under such circumstances a steady transition from regularity to irregularity must result as a governing Law and as a general basal characteristic of all natural processes. In physics this is believed to be the source from which the very definite one-directional tendency of all natural happenings arises. If an initial state, which may be called the cause, entails a subsequent state, which may be called its effect, the latter, according to the teaching of molecular physics, is always the more haphazard or less orderly one. It is, moreover, precisely the state which can be anticipated with overwhelming probability provided it is admitted that the behaviour of the single molecule is absolutely haphazard. And so we have the paradox that, from the point of view of the physicist, *chance lies at the root of causality.*" *Schroedinger—Science and the Human Temperament.*

The premiums charged by the Insurance Companies are entirely based on statistical mathematics. From the previous records of the births and deaths in a country, their Actuaries are able to obtain a fairly good estimate of the average mortality per thousand of the inhabitants per year. The Insurance Companies thus know that in the normal course of a year they would have to pay out such-and-such an amount per thousands of persons insured by them. Hence they can arrive at the proper amount to be charged from the various persons who are insured with them.

Though they are able to make a fairly good estimate of the total number of persons that are likely to die among per thousands of the inhabitants annually, they are unable to tell *which* of them are the unlucky ones. Moreover, to the Insurance Companies this knowledge would be useless. They are only concerned with the total mortality.

This does not mean that there are no methods of determining *who* are the likely individuals that will die during the course of a given year. Proper investigations into the heredity, environment, health and periodic medical examination of each and every individual will give all the required information. But the task would be enormous and will serve no useful purpose as far the insurance companies are concerned.

In the same way if we could find the initial positions, velocities and the forces acting upon each one of the billions of individual electrons taking part in a physical or chemical action, and could also identify each individual entity out of all these electrons or atoms, we shall be in a position to get rid of this uncertainty.

"And we shall even contend that strictly causal determinism of the elementary processes, although we cannot observe their details, must necessarily be admitted, in order to allow the phenomena, which result from their co-operation, to be treated by the method of statistics and the probability calculus. From this point of view causality would lie at the basis of statistical law. Therefore chance here is something subjective—only a name for our inability to discover the detailed action of numerous small component causes." *Schroedinger—Science and the Human Temperament.*

To sum up : In modern physics

- (1) the *uncertainty* about the individuality of the electron which jumps its orbit.
- (2) the uncertainty of simultaneously determining the velocity and position of an electron and
- (3) the use of the Calculus of Probability—Statistical methods in place of the classical mechanics have led some scientists, as well as some philosophers, to jump to the conclusion that as the electrons are *erratic* in their behaviours so are the human beings.

It would be fitting to close this paper by quoting the opinion of Max Planck, the father of the modern quantum physics—

“We may perhaps here deal with free will. Our consciousness, which after all is the most important source of cognition, assures us that free will is supreme. Yet we are forced to ask whether human will is causally determined or not. Put in this way the question, as I have frequently tried to show, is a good example of the kind of problem which I have described as illusory, by which I mean that, taken literally, it has no exact meaning. In the present instance the apparent difficulty is due to an incomplete formulation of the question. The actual facts may be briefly stated as follows. From the point of view of an ideal and all comprehensive spirit, human will, like every material and spiritual events, is completely determined causally. Looked at subjectively, however, the will, in so far as it looks to the future, is not causally determined, because any cognition of the subject's will itself acts causally upon the will, so that any definite cognition of a fixed causal nexus is out of question. In other words, we might say that looked at from outside (objectively) the will is causally determined and that looked at from inside (subjectively) it is free. There is here no contradiction, any more than there was in the previous debate about the right and left hand side. And those who fail to agree to this overlook or forget the fact that the subject's will is never completely subordinate to its cognition and indeed always has the last word.” *Max Planck—The Philosophy of Physics.*

Like the dual nature of *Light*, human *will* also possesses duality. Sometimes it appears to be free and at others bound.

Scientists with their experiments on jada (life-less) objects, and philosophers with their logic and arguments only will never be able to get at their real nature.

Only those who are able to transcend the limitations of our space and time may be able to penetrate behind the veil of this mystery.

On Causality : The Status of the Principle of Causality in Modern Physics

By
B. VENKATESACHAR

Newtonian dynamics implies strict determinism in Physical Phenomena. Given the state of an isolated material system its state for all future time can be predicted so also could be determined what its state was at any previous time. The state of a material system is known when the positions and velocities (or more properly moments) of its parts are known. If the positions and velocities of the components of a group of material elements at any instant are given the positions and velocities of the components at any future instant can be predicted from calculation based on dynamical laws. The accuracy with which the prediction can be made depends on the accuracy with which the initial condition can be specified. In classical dynamics there is no theoretical limit to the accuracy with which the initial state can be specified by measurement. In actual measurement there is always a certain error due to the imperfections of the instruments used in the measurement. This error can be reduced by perfecting the instruments. Theoretically there is no limit to the extent to which this error can be reduced.

The advent of the quantum theory has made the above position untenable in the domain of atomic physics. In order to be able to predict the state of a material system at a future time with any *desired* degree of accuracy, the present positions

and velocities of the components should be known with a corresponding degree of accuracy. Since there is no *theoretical* limit to the accuracy with which these positions and velocities can be determined by the use of measuring instruments there is no limit to the accuracy with which the future state can be predicted. In the *limit*, we may say, that the future is accurately predictable. This is, the position in classical physics. The quantum theory sets a limit to the accuracy attainable in the measurements of positions and velocities at any instant. It must be emphasised that no imaginable refinement in the apparatus employed in the measurement can overcome this difficulty. The very fact that we attempt to make a measurement theoretically implies this defect.

Let us take the case of an electron. In order to find its position we must use some kind of light (radiation) to see electron. The shorter the wave-length of light used, the more accurate is the measurement of the position. But the shorter the wave-length of the radiation, the more energetic (heavy) is a quantum of this light and when the quantum hits the electron, the velocity of the electron changes; this change in the velocity increases with the increase in the energy of the quantum. That is, the shorter the wave-length of the light used in observing the position of the electron the greater is the change of its velocity produced in the act of observing the electron. The greater the accuracy attained in determining the position, the more is the inaccuracy introduced in our knowledge of its velocity and vice-versa. The result of these considerations is that a precise knowledge of the initial condition by measurement becomes meaningless. In large scale phenomena such as those of the motions of celestial bodies, the discrepancies in measurement contemplated in the above considerations are vanishingly small and do not matter. This is not the case when we are dealing with atomic phenomena.

In quantum physics (wave-mechanics) the concept of 'material particle' is replaced by the concept of 'wave packet.' A wave packet is a large number of superposed waves which interfere with each other and cancel out except in the narrow region of the wave packet which takes the place of the material particle of classical Physics. Here it is necessary to make one remark. Waves in classical physics are actual physical changes perceptible and measureable, e.g., water waves and sound waves or electromagnetic variations in the case of Hertzian waves. But the waves contemplated in wave mechanics are not of this nature. Wave mechanics is in fact a mathematical technique which enables one to calculate the probability that the observed result in an experiment will have a particular value. Suppose the experiment is repeated a large number of times the number of times the experiment will yield a given result can be calculated. So when a new measurement is made, the probability that the experiment will yield a particular value can be calculated. If it turns out that this probability is one in any case, it is certain that the measurement will yield this particular value.

The net result of the above considerations may be stated thus :—

(i) In microscopic phenomena, (atomic and subatomic physics), the law of causality as understood in classical physics becomes meaningless. The physicist is compelled to apply to these cases the calculus of probability.

(ii) In macroscopic or large scale phenomena, for example, the motion of celestial bodies, what appear to us as the reign of the strict law of causality can be shown to be extreme cases of statistical laws : the accurate predictions are cases where the probability of occurrence differs from one (i. e.) certainty by a quantity which is vanishingly small.

In classical physics statistical methods were also used but in such cases it was presumed that the statistical methods had a causal background that is, that the statistical methods of calculation could be replaced by deterministic dynamical methods provided our knowledge of the elements of the material system under consideration were adequate. But now, according to a school of physicists, the position is reversed : the law of causality has to be abandoned and all calculations predicting physical events are ultimately founded on statistical laws. This school may be called the indeterministic school.

There is, however, another school of physicists who refuse to give up the principle of causality and hold that the aim of the physicist should now be so to modify the statement of the principle of causality as to meet the present situation; (*i.e.*) the law of causality must be restated so as to meet the present situation. Prominent among physicists of this way of thinking are Planck and Einstein. In passing it may be noted that it is Planck's quantum theory that led Heisenberg to postulate his principle of indeterminacy, the sheet anchor of the indeterminists. The position of Planck may be summarised thus :—

(i) It has been remarked above that as a result of the quantum theory the apparatus used in the measurement introduces an error into the measurement, an error which no refinement in the instrument can avoid. Planck suggests that the law of causality and the consequent strict determinism can be maintained provided the experimenter and the apparatus employed are included in and taken account of as part of the physical system which is under observation and on which the measurement is made.

(ii) In the above suggestion the measured description of an event in the objective world is not independent of the observer and his measuring instrument. Of this defect Planck is deeply

conscious. To remedy this defect Planck introduces the concept of an all-knowing ideal mind whose knowledge is *independent* of measuring instruments. Let us quote his words. 'The most perfect harmony and consequently the strictest causality in any case culminates in the assumption that there is an ideal spirit having a full knowledge of the action of the natural forces as well as the intellectual life of men ; a knowledge extending to every detail embracing present, past and future.'

The present attitude of Einstein can best be stated in his own words. " Some physicists, among them myself, cannot believe that we must abandon, actually and for ever, the idea of direct representation of physical reality in space and time ; or that we must accept the view that events in Nature are analogous to a game of chance. It is open to every man to choose the direction of his striving ; and also every man may draw comfort from Lessing's fine saying, that the search for truth is more precious than its possession."

To appreciate the significance of the above passage we must remember that quantum physics 'makes no attempt to give a mathematical representation of what is actually present or goes on in space and time' and 'for the time being we have to admit that we do not possess any general basis for physics which can be regarded as its logical foundation.'

Such is the state of affairs in physics at the present time in respect to the principle of causality. Whatever the course which mathematical physics takes in days to come, the physicist must take account of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy which has come to stay.

On Causality :

Some Advanced Western and Eastern Views

By

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER.

"Since all experiments are subject to the laws of Quantum mechanics the latter definitely proves the invalidity of the Causal Law"—Heisenberg.

"Cause and effect is irrational appearance. If the sequence is different how is the ascription of the difference to be rationally defended? If, on the other hand, it is not different, then Causation is a farce. There is no escape from this fundamental dilemma."—Bradley.

"There is no such thing as cause and effect".

—Swami Vivekananda.

Introduction

An attempt is made in the following paras to present chiefly what may be considered the most advanced—not merely the latest—phase of the philosophical interpretation of the Concept of Causality, without ignoring its bearing on the doctrine of "Indeterminacy" in science. This paper being necessarily brief, it has to pass over much of the historical aspect as known not only to the West but also to the East. From Lucretius to Aristotle in Greece, from Descartes and Spinoza to Kant and Bergson in modern Europe, from Hume to Bosanquet and Bradley or Wildon Carr and Turner in England, and from the predecessors of Gautama and Kanada to the latest Jain, Buddhist and the several Vedantic thinkers

in India, no philosopher worth the name has failed to deal with or refer to some of the implications of this concept. To add to this, the Western scientists from Newton to Heisenberg, Max Planck, Bohr, Schroedinger, Huxley, Jeans, Eddington, Einstein, Bertrand Russel and several others have also thrown much fresh light on it. Though therefore a historical study of the development of thought relative to this subject will undoubtedly be of immense value, not only from the standpoint of philosophy and science but also from that of religion, it is not possible to go into any such details here. Nor is it the object of this paper to present the arguments for and against every one of the several interpretations or views, nor even to point out the fallacies in each. For, the result of all the discussions or enquiries made from the dawn of human thought up to the present moment is that the subject is riddled with contradictions. Even to this day men talk of 'Soul or Mind' as something different from 'body' and yet know not how the one is causally connected with the other, or as C. D. Broad puts it, "We are not agreed still on the right analysis of "Cause". So, here, it will be no more than a waste of energy and time to go into the *details* of all *exploded* surmises, though mankind clings or has to cling to causality along with so many other unrealities. It is the final phase that we are concerned with chiefly.

What is causality ?

(1) In the words of some of the modern authorities this question may be answered as follows :—

"One thing follows upon another, not simply in the sense that one comes after the other, but in the sense that there is a certain regularity in the relation between the one kind and the other". (Mackenzie)

"In Physics and Psychology such phenomena are said to be causally related as invariably succeed each other in time. The perception of succession is all that is really observed here. At any rate an inner connection, a necessity that binds these together is not a matter of observation. I perceive that a certain state follows upon a given state. I expect the event to succeed it the next time it occurs. Here we have the Causal Conception". (Paulsen)

"Cause is the totality of conditions in the presence of which an event occurs and in the absence of any member of which it does not occur. The sequence must be under definitely known conditions. (A. J. Thomson).

He adds—"The question of causality involves an entry into a difficult and dangerous territory."

"A cause is an invariable antecedent. Armed with this conception of cause as mere sequence and with the assumption of the uniformity of nature the scientist is in possession of all that he needs to control phenomena and predict the future. *But still we do not know what a cause really is.* There must be, so it seems to us, something more than mere sequence;..... which philosophy seeks."

—A. Eddington.

"Cause is an attempt to account rationally for change. A becomes B; and this alteration is felt to be not compatible with A. Mere A would still be mere A, and if it turns to be something different then something else is concerned. But the endeavour to find a satisfactory reason is fruitless."

—Bradley.

"What the principle of causation does for us is to enable us to bring together things that are in themselves different as being connected by relations that have certain regularity".

—De.

Some modern presentation of the Indian view.

“Karana (cause) is a necessary antecedent which is not taken up in the bringing about of something else. Karya (effect) is that necessary consequent which is not brought about by something else”.

— Keith.

Ancient 'philosophic' views.

Both in India and in Greece there were thinkers that bestowed considerable thought on this subject and formulated their interpretations. They viewed cause from different stand-points and classified them as 'Material', 'Formal', 'Efficient', 'Instrumental', 'Accessory', 'First', 'Ultimate', 'Final' and so forth. Some substituted 'ground and conclusion' for cause and effect, as being more comprehensive and accurate. There are many other varieties such as "occasion", "Unwinding", into which we cannot go here as it is needless for the purposes of this paper. All these have been criticised by later philosophers and scientists, though the religiously minded have clung to some of the items of the old classifications. A few recent thinkers hold, as have been indicated above, that we know only the "Formal" aspect of this law or of change. But another of the old views is still current. According to it causal relation has three aspects :—

(1) one may think of the cause from the stand-point of the effect, *i.e.* think of the past.

(2) one may anticipate the effect from the stand-point of the cause, *i.e.* think of the future ;

(3) one may view the same event as both cause and effect, combining (1) and (2).

Now, religion has clung to the beliefs in a 'First' or 'Ultimate' cause as well as in a 'Final', which stress the *past*, and which have led to its doctrines of Creation, Predestination and Predetermination. Those that laid emphasis on the future aspect were led to Free Will Indeterminacy, Uncertainty, Probability &c. of the modern scientists who are interested more in controlling and directing the future.

The Common Man's View.

Human beings in the earliest times, do not seem to have *reflected* on the relation between events. It is said that there exist people even now that know nothing definitely of any *connection* between phenomena. At a more developed stage man seems to have recalled his past *personal* experience and *reflected* thereon. He willed and produced some results in himself. And he seems to have thought that all physical or external phenomena were similarly governed. Influenced by religious faith he clung to this belief though experience taught him that there was a lack of uniformity or certainty in this respect. He believed "That there is a destiny that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will". This interpretation is evidently anthropomorphic in its origin.

Even from very early times man has found it necessary to believe in miraculous happenings, unexpected turns, accidents, chance, luck, fate, *vis major*, and the like.

Modern Tendencies

With the advance of scientific knowledge the critical spirit has naturally developed. More exactness and precision are demanded in our thinking. At first, scientists wholly relied upon "causal" relation, as a certainty or necessity, as did Newton and others who made some great discoveries, especially in astronomy. Now they find that there is not the same

certainty to be found not only in the physical world but even in the psychological.

That Hume did not believe in causal relation as an objective fact, that Kant did not believe in anything of the kind in 'things-in-themselves' though he clung to causality as a form of thought, that Spinoza and Descartes held that the cause contained the effect and perhaps something more, that some modern thinkers like Bergson hold that the effect has something in addition to what is known to exist in the cause, in so far as they believe in 'Creativity' are well known. There is also Lloyd Morgan's theory of the "Emergence" of new features. All these only increase one's doubts in the certainty or definiteness of the causal law.

The following quotations will reveal the tendency, better.

"If we state the law of Causality in the form of 'If we know the present we can calculate the future' it is not the conclusion but the premise which is false, for we can never know the present completely in full detail."

—Heisenberg.

"When we come to differences of kind the gulf between them seems so impassable that it seems hardly possible even to conceive of any means by which the existence of those particular distinction could be made intelligible"

—Zimar.

"Cause is not yet defined in such a way as to satisfy the enquiring mind."

—Patrik.

'The cause of any thing is everything else, the universe itself'.

—Mackenzie & others.

"The tough minded realist will insist on the universal religion of determinism and the absolute validity of the law

of Causality while the more tender minded idealist or neopositivist will welcome the new studies in physics as a vindication of some kind of freedom even in the world of physical reality. But I suppose that science is itself now moving towards a greater degree of tender mindedness than was formerly suspected."

—Mackenzie.

"Causation implies change and it is difficult to know of what we may predicate the change."

—Bradley.

"A genuine cause always must be the whole cause and the whole never could be complete until it has taken in the universe. And this is impossible."

—do

"Causal determinism by something pre-existing is, though a very common idea, yet one that proves logically incomprehensible when it is closely studied."

—W. Windelband.

"Causality is a principle which has not been experimentally verified." "It cannot be demonstrated."

—Eddington.

"The denial of determinism or as it is often called the law of causality does not mean that it is denied that effects may proceed from cause."

—do

"An assertion or denial of causation can hardly be proved."

—do

"It is empty talk that every event has a cause."

—Maxborn.

The present situation (in the West).

- (1) The common man cannot ignore the causal principle

in life or in any one of his actions though he is aware of its uncertainty, and believes in accidents, miracles and the rest. Every day man has to sow that he may reap. In the world of religion also which follows in the footsteps of the common man, causality holds its sway as ever before. The belief in God's Creation of the world and in God's purpose and His freewill Predestination is there. Further, there can be no order or government in society unless men are held responsible for actions done by them and believe in causality as well as Freewill.

(2) In the world of scientists the validity of determinism or causality seems to be losing its force. This does not mean that they hold that only chance or irregularity characterises Nature. "A profounder experience has now taught us", says Zimmer, "that it (the causal law) must be replaced by a law of more general character which allows us to predict from a state known with a certain degree of certainty what will happen within certain limits in the Future". But a few scientists have taken a jump into Freewill. This has made the believers in religion jubilant for they think that science has won back for God the powers, which others had wrested from Him.

Nevertheless there are a few scientists who believe that causality or determinism has not collapsed. Some others like Bertrand Russel hold that though for the time being the causal law is under a cloud yet it will emerge in full glory in the future, when further advance is made.

(3) Physically or psychologically no *definite* relation, mechanical *i. e.* mathematical or measurable is known to exist between cause and effect, or more accurately, between phenomena. Nevertheless the indefinite behaviour of Atoms or electrons, may be due to *causes* still unknown. Neither can we predetermine or foresee *definitely* the future even though

the antecedents are known. All the same, this does not disprove the possible existence of some definite connection between phenomena.

It is thus seen that there exists no agreement among the Philosophers and Scientists. But what is more, *every* human being finds some contradiction or uncertainty in his or her own life and yet cannot help acting.

The Inconsistency or contradiction.

The common man's as well as the religious man's explanation of the contradiction in the belief in the causal law and its failure is that man has not been able to understand as yet all about causality and that God's ways and Freewill are inscrutable. The causal law is not invalid. But its implications are not fully understood yet

But what is striking is that scientists though they say that the old notion of "causality" has been exploded and that it has given place to uncertainty or indeterminacy, yet they also are obliged every day to have recourse to experiments relying as ever before on the value of causal *relation*. This inconsistency has been noticed by some of the great leaders of modern thought. In this respect the most advanced scientific thinkers and philosophers are on the same level as the men of religion or the common men *i.e.* in so far as their experience reveals inconsistency and indefiniteness or uncertainty.

The philosophers however seem to realise that they should think deeper to get more light. They see that when those that look at life from one stand-point find causality to be reliable, others that view it from another, find uncertainty reigning. The ordinary man or the religious man stresses or is obliged to stress one aspect at one time and another at another time, as it suits his *mood*.

Some of the philosophers have therefore rightly asked themselves, the *higher* question : what does this *impulse* to rely and act upon causality though it is seen that it is uncertain and unreliable, imply ?

The answer is best given in the words of Mackenzie "what the principle of causation does for us is to enable us to bring together things that are 'in themselves different.'" Both the physical and the psychological worlds are characterised by difference and multiplicity ; but causality points to some inner connection or unity.

Europe gives no final or verifiable solution of this problem of contradictions. Jeans and Eddington, the great scientists, do see that there exists uncertainty or indeterminacy. But these thinkers have unconsciously fallen victims to their religious complex, which has made them rely upon the doctrines of "Mathematical architect" and supreme "freewill," both of which convey no meaning unless they are coordinated with the causal notion. Both the terms "Architect" and "Freewill" imply agency and the doing of something, which is the same as 'effecting.' Even God has to be 'causing.' Causation is a part of His nature. If so, how are we certain that He Himself is not an effect ? These thinkers have not disproved the eternity or the validity of the causal principle. This has been pointed out by the ancient philosophers of the East as well as the West.

The Hindu view.

(1) As has been hinted at the beginning, modern Europe has given us nothing *that had not* been known to the ancient Hindus in respect of the concept of causality. It has only repeated what India said more than a thousand years ago. And there is still something in India that Europe can learn if it cares to. Gautama and Kanada lived long before

Aristotle and what is more Gaudapada and the Buddhist Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti lived at least a thousand years before Heisenberg and Eddington. These Eastern men have thought more deeply on this subject than their modern representatives. Like Aristotle, the Indian thinkers had classified the kinds of causes and also criticised them. The disputes between the Tarkikas and the Sankhyas, as well as the Mimamsakas may be briefly summed up as follows, it being admitted that 'mind' does not exist by itself apart from 'body.' If it be 'form' alone that changes, and not 'substance or matter,' where does the new form come from? Has this new 'form' no cause? If both substance and form change, where exists the connecting link between "Cause" and "Effect." If effect be contained in the Cause we cannot predicate any change of substance or form. Besides these "Arambha" and "Parinama" *वाद*s as they are termed in India, which try to escape the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* which in turn conflicts with God's creativity and which, as indicated above, are known in Europe also, there is the doctrine of "Vivarta" which says that causal relation is something similar to mental construction or superimposition. This is akin to the Kantian view and has likewise been refuted. The concept of "Upurva" which holds that something new or unforeseen comes into existence in the effect, has forestalled centuries ago the "Emergence" and "Creativity" theories of the West.

Much deeper, however, goes the thought of Sri Harsha, who observes as follows :— In as much as causality implies change and sequence, at what moment or 'point' of time does Cause change into effect—a something different from cause? When we spot that point of time we shall be able to see how cause becomes effect, not till then, Change itself is inexplicable.

The Indian Buddhist Nagarjuna has also pursued the enquiry on similar lines and come to the conclusion that 'causality' is no more than a common characteristic of human ignorance. He says :— "No causes there, no non-causes, since (altogether) no result." "The world has neither a beginning nor an end."

The coping stone is finally placed by the great Gaudapada in the following verses :—

"Nothing whatever is produced (is an effect) either of itself or of another. Nothing is produced whether it be being or non-being or both being and non-being."

"Nothing of this (manifold universe) is an effect in as much as, creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact."

"The inability (to explain), the ignorance (of the nature) and the impossibility (of proving) the order of succession or sequence only lead the wise to shed light on the truth of non-causality" (Ajati).

'Ajati', the negation of the causal concept, is the last word of the *philosophic* view in India.

Thus much for the ~~philosophic~~ interpretations.

(2) Though the work-a-day world and the religious *Hindus* believe that whatever happens is directly the result of God's will as its cause, and the world His creation, yet the thoughtful among them modify this belief in various ways each according to his own taste or temperament. The view that is generally held by the latter is that the universe is beginningless (Anadi). It does not hold God to be the Creator of man and to be responsible for the production of this world so full of evil. Good and evil are also beginningless as well as infallible. It believes in the unforeseen (*adrishta*), fate, luck, accident and so forth. The Hindu generally says

that the laws of Nature are also immutable. The causal law is one such. What are known as its failures, as indicated above, are in perfect consonance with the causal law. They are also caused by causes, which are still not known and which have to be traced even to *prenatal* or some far off antecedent existence not known yet. Nothing is seen to come out of antecedent 'non existence'. No child is born without a mother and a father, It should have existed in some form in the parents and they in turn in their parents. This unbroken continuity of the causal chain is evident in the physical and psychological worlds. There is an ethical side also, which says that just as a man reaps what he sows, man's actions in a previous life are the causes not only of his birth but also of many of his joys and sorrows in this life. This causal view is known as the '*karma*' doctrine, into the metaphysical details of which we cannot go here. It will suffice to note here that it is *irrefutable by anyone in this world*, so long as one acts, to the least extent, relying on causality, as valid.

According to this view God's laws are perfect. Good and evil are man's own creations based on the causal law. The Hindu seeks to be perfectly just to God. For in the absence of positive evidence he will not blame Him as the creator or cause of evil or of one man's prosperity and another's sorrow in life. On the principle of the beginningless causal principle he explains the existence of evil, consistently with God's omniscience as well as His mercifulness or goodness. *Europe has to learn this lesson that as one sows one reaps, i. e. the 'Karma' doctrine.*

(3) Then the *most important* question naturally arises as to how the Hindu explains the contradiction i. e. reconciles the philosophic truth of the negation of causality with the belief in religion and in its certainty or probability relied on

practical life, which demands faith in the causal law. In other words, how does he reconcile Karmic determinacy with the free-will efforts to overcome or ward off evil and to shape one's future ?

Here again the ancient Hindu philosopher has something to offer to the West for consideration. He asks : What is thought ? How does it arise ? He enquires whether it is possible to have a meaning for the term 'cause' without connecting it, in thought with 'effect' and vice versa. Similarly with the terms 'indeterminacy' or 'Uncertainty' and their correlatives. He finds that the human mind fails to find a meaning for any term when it is divorced from its opposite, or correlative, in thought. So are the concepts of 'free-will' and 'architect' and the like. It follows from this that the universe as ordinarily viewed by the human mind is subject *at one and the same time* to determinism and indeterminism (uncertainty). Man takes only partial or side views as it suits his moods or purposes. But when the whole, in other words, both sides are seen, that is, when 'truth' is known and *verified*, the reality is found to be beyond both determinism and indeterminism. These concepts ~~or~~ terms have no meaning *then*. The entire universe or existence is found to be either bound by relations or devoid of any such relations, according as one views it from the stand point of either ignorance (of truth) or of knowledge (of truth) respectively. Just as truth is beyond both Idealism and Realism though people keep fighting about them, so truth is beyond both causality and indeterminacy, though men are seen to differ and have doubts with reference to them. This fact, let it be remembered, can be directly verified, *though only by those that make deeper enquiry*.

The above solution looks somewhat like the Hegelian way of synthesising 'thesis' and 'antithesis'. But in Indian philosophy

synthesis is not the ultimate stage, *nor* even the 'Absolute'. There is something still higher *i.e.* truth as such which is *not* the 'Absolute'.

Why has not the West seen this truth ?

The answer is that the West does not wish to see it. It is averse to deep *thinking*, in this *'respect'*. As Patrick says, "We have acquired too much wealth and not enough wisdom... Stop, look and listen – the prudent caution at rail road crossings must be amended to read "Stop look, listen and *Think*, not for the saving of a few lives in rail road accidents, but for the preservation of the life of humanity".

Further, with some rare exceptions the thinkers in the West still seem to cling *tenaciously* to that view of truth that declares 'Whatever agrees with what *I like* is truth, and whatever *disagrees* with what *I like* or what agrees with what *I dislike* cannot be truth.

The Hindu philosopher Gaudapada says :—"When attachment (due to egoism) is gone causality vanishes ; cause and effect "become non-existent". In other words, though the West knows that truth-seeking demands "self elimination" or "De-personalization" yet it knows not how to do this to perfection.

The Hindu philosopher however persevered in the teeth of innumerable obstacles or difficulties and reached Truth as such, and verified it *i.e.* the truth beyond all possibilities of contradictions and conflict. The West however seems to think that the Hindu that relies upon such a doctrine is in the primitive stage, though he be not crazy or foolish. For, the test or the standard of wisdom in the *West* according to its own view of truth seems to be still confined to politics, especially of *self-advancement*. The *West* has no time to think *deeply* on any other subject as yet. But contradictions in thought and conflicts

in life cannot cease till '*truth*' as such is known and realised. Truth abhors differences and limitations of any kind.

Some are of the belief that such truth is the Absolute which is attained only in mystic *ecstasies* or transcendental *intuitions*, or when one sees not this world as we see it. But nothing can be a greater '*delusion*'. 'Philosophy'—not mysticism or religion—in India holds that it is only when the *phenomena* of the universe are before us as in our normal state that the causal connection between them is *proved* to be *not* a fact and that this truth is verifiable. Indeterminacy is but the first step leading to Ajati. If the scientists will only make up their mind to 'think' *deeper*, they can reach it.

Conclusion

What causality or indeterminacy in all its modifications really means cannot be known till the meaning of '*truth*' as such is known. And the meaning of '*truth*' as such cannot be known till what the great scientists term 'Self-elimination' or 'De-personalization' or as the Hindus put it 'Ego-eradication' is brought about *completely*. Till *truth* as such is reached causality or ~~determinism~~ as well as the law of *Karma*, in some form will be a fact inseparable from life and irrefutable. But non-causality, indeterminacy, freewill, fate, luck and like unforeseen occurrences though they involve us in contradictions and conflicts will also be as much a fact; but they do not invalidate the former. They only direct our thought to something higher, stimulating further or deeper enquiry. 'The more we advance the greater becomes our doubt and the stronger our desire to get at '*truth*.' For, doubt is the best incentive to seekers after '*truth*.' Till causality is understood the wrangles of scientific and philosophical 'isms' will not cease.

I have had the good fortune to meet in the course of my

travels, eminent thinkers in the West who in our talks showed the keenest interest in seeking 'truth,' though they had not the same interest in defining 'truth' as such. But in connection with talks on causality only two were able to divest themselves of their 'ego' or 'Superiority' complex as demanded by the greatest seekers after truth in the East as well as in the West, both in science and in philosophy, and to enquire into the Hindu view of 'truth' and its bearing on causality. They were Prof. Max Planck of Berlin and Prof. Bergson of Paris, both of whom evinced their deepest appreciation of the same.

Truth, like the Sun, is not visible, so long as man is eager to keep his eyes on his own shadow (the ego) and as in some parts of the world, or in some seasons or when the sky (mind) is clouded. But it is there shining, all the same, always. When this Sun of truth is seen, all contradictions, *causal* or non-causal or other, and all *conflicts* cease, says "Philosophy" in India.

